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ABSTRACT ESSAY 1 
RAPID OVER-REACTION: PERCEIVED VALUE CREATION VIA ALLIANCE 
ANNOUNCEMENTS 
by 
Matthias Bollmus 
The University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee, 2013 
Under the Supervision of Professor Edward Levitas 
 
 
The management literature has widely acknowledged the importance of studying and 
understanding the determinants of the market’s reactions to the announcements of 
strategic alliances. With a focus on dyadic alliances, I ask what types of information 
signaled to the market by the alliance announcement influence the investors’ perception 
of value. I hypothesize that the type of technical expertise, relationship expertise, and 
market expertise of each alliance partner, expressed as either explorative or exploitative, 
sends decodable signals to the investors, which in turn influences their reaction to the 
new alliance announcement. Using a sample of 927 alliances extracted from a unique 
biopharmaceutical dataset, I proxied investors’ reaction to the alliance announcements by 
calculating the cumulative abnormal return during a three-day window around the 
alliance announcement. I found that while technical expertise does not appear to be a 
signal that investors consider when valuing firms involved in a new alliance, both 
relationship expertise and market expertise showed a statistically significant influence on 
the investors’ perception of value.  
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ABSTRACT ESSAY 2: 
REDUCING INVESTOR ANXIETY VIA ALLIANCE PARTNER SELECTION 
by 
Matthias Bollmus 
The University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee, 2013 
Under the Supervision of Professor Edward Levitas 
 
 
The management literature has recognized strategic alliances as an organizational 
form that has the potential to reduce uncertainty. One important step for alliances in order 
to achieve a reduction in uncertainty is selecting the right partner, one that enables the 
alliance to effectively address the specific type of uncertainty it faces. In this study, I 
specifically address the question of whether the perceived uncertainty of investors at the 
time of the alliance announcement is influenced by whether the skills and expertise of the 
two alliance partners are similar or complementary (diverse). I suggest that the level of 
technical expertise, expressed as either explorative or exploitative and interpreted as 
either similar or complementary, sends a signal to the investors, which in turn will impact 
their perception of uncertainty. In addition, I study whether this relationship is moderated 
by the level of exogenous uncertainty faced by the alliance. Using a sample of 927 
alliances extracted from a unique biopharmaceutical dataset, I found that exogenous 
uncertainty in fact moderates the relationship between partner similarity/ 
complementarity and investors’ perception of uncertainty.  
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ABSTRACT ESSAY 3:  
SPILLOVER EFFECTS IN ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIPS 
by 
Matthias Bollmus 
The University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee, 2013 
Under the Supervision of Professor Edward Levitas 
 
 Entering multiple simultaneous alliances is a common practice, especially in R&D 
intense industries. While this strategy may enhance the possibility of success by 
attempting to simultaneously unlock possible synergistic effects in multiple alliances, it 
also exposes the alliance partners to spillover effects created by their partners’ alliances. 
In this study I will examine how one specific action of one partner, to enter a new 
alliance, affects the initial alliance partner. Specifically, given that firm A and firm B are 
in an existing alliance, how will the market react to the information that firm A has 
entered into a new alliance with firm C, and how will the market reaction affect firm B 
(the initial alliance partner)? I develop and test two sets of competing hypotheses using a 
unique biopharmaceutical dataset and find that the market reacts favorably to the new 
alliance as measured by the change in value of firm B’s stock price. My goal is to 
contribute to the literature by testing how the signals sent by the alliance to the market 
affect the initial alliance partner and thus if investors monitor and react to post-alliance 
events.  
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RAPID OVER-REACTION: PERCEIVED VALUE CREATION VIA ALLIANCE 
ANNOUNCEMENTS 
2 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Studies have shown that investors generally react positively to an initial alliance 
announcement (Dyer, Kale, & Singh, 2001; Shah & Swaminathan, 2008). However, these 
initial expectations are often not realized in that alliances fail to generate subsequent 
desired and expected returns (Kale, Dyer, & Singh, 2002). These findings point to the 
uncertainty faced by investors when making predictions as to how alliances will perform 
at the time of the alliance announcement, and how to assess the value of the partners. It is 
this investor reaction to the alliance at the time of the alliance announcement that is the 
focus of this study.   
 What causes investors to react to an alliance announcement, what signals are sent by 
the alliance, and how are these signals decoded by investors? With a focus on dyadic 
alliances, I specifically look at the skills and expertise of the alliance partners, which I 
suggest send signals to the investors. Specifically, I ask whether three specific types of 
signals that I have identified influence the investors’ perception of value.  
I investigate how the degree of technical, relationship, and market expertise of the 
two partner firms in the focal alliance sends a signal to investors, which in turn triggers 
the investor’s reaction. Equally important, I examine how reactions vary along multiple 
components forming the explore/exploit dichotomy.  Unlike previous research which has 
viewed exploration and exploitation along technological similarities, I will study the 
concepts of exploration and exploitation along many dimensions of the value chain. I 
chose the dimension of exploration and exploitation because I suggest that explorative 
and exploitative expertise send very rich signals to the investors, meaning that said 
signals carry information that investors decode and act upon. Exploration and 
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exploitation provide an effective base on which to assess investor reactions, since their 
definitions are premised on the degree to which firm activity diverges with previous 
activity and thus causes reassessment by investors at the time of the alliance 
announcement. 
My research question is as follows: what information signaled to the investors by the 
alliance announcement creates a perception of value and subsequently triggers investor 
reaction as measured by the change in market value of one of the alliance partners? I will 
focus on three areas of partner and alliance expertise (technical expertise, relationship 
expertise, and market expertise) and state those in terms of exploratory or exploitative 
expertise. I will note that I am not considering the explorative or exploitative level of 
each individual firm, but rather that all three expertise, and the level of exploration / 
exploitation depend on the specific partner combination.  
I code technical expertise as explorative or exploitative based on patent citation 
overlap.  Explorative expertise is based on a low patent citation overlap (suggesting that 
the combined technical expertise by the partners is exploratory since the partner firms 
cite patents that are very different from each other), and exploitative expertise is based on 
a high value of patent citation overlap (suggesting that the expertise brought into the 
alliance by one partner is not that unique and new to the other partner as evidenced by a 
higher number of common patent citations). Relationship expertise is considered 
explorative when the two alliance partners have little or no, and possibly unrelated, prior 
experience in working with each other (e.g., if they have worked with each other but on a 
different type of alliance, or a long time ago, etc.). If they have relevant and/or recent 
work experience with each other, the relationship expertise would be considered 
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exploitative. Finally, market expertise refers to the alliance partners’ documented 
experience and skill in bringing a new product to market prior to the focal relationship. 
Relatively little prior experience will be coded as explorative, while significant prior 
experience would be coded exploitative.  
The basic premises of my hypotheses are that investors will decode and react to 
signals sent by the alliance. As such, these signals frame the investors’ perception of 
value. The investors’ reaction is based on the context in which exploration or exploitation 
occurs, as well as the investors’ perception of how it will affect the future performance 
and returns of the alliance. 
While exploration is usually associated with higher potential returns, I suggest that 
this does not always lead to higher value as perceived by investors when examined across 
all three constructs (technical, relationship, and marketing). Exploiting an existing 
competency could also lead to measurable returns. If investors display a preference for 
lower but more probable return over a more risky but potentially very high return, it will 
shape the investors’ perception of value. Therefore, investors could theoretically react 
either positively or negatively to an alliance that focuses predominately on exploration or 
exploitation within two of the three dimensions that I have defined, while in the context 
of the third dimension (market expertise) I suggest that the investors’ reaction is more 
predictable (although not certain). 
This study contributes to the literature by furthering the understanding of 
determinants of investors’ perception of value of alliance formations. This, I suggest, will 
increase our understanding of investor reaction to alliance formation which, given the 
many overvaluations at the time of the announcement, is needed. By studying what 
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factors may contribute to investors’ (positive) reaction to the alliance announcement I 
aim to offer suggestions on which factors to further study. A linear mixed model 
regression analysis using a sample of 927 biopharmaceutical alliances will test my 
hypotheses. 
The following section provides an overview of the literature and theory of alliance 
formation, leading to the hypotheses that I will test in this paper. Subsequent sections 
show the empirical analyses and discussion of the findings. The paper concludes with a 
discussion of the implications and limitations of this study.   
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 Alliances may be defined as formal cooperative agreements between two or more 
organizations involving the pooling or trading of resources, linked together with or 
without equity. Alliances differ along many dimensions, and one main difference is the 
purpose for which alliances are formed. This may include one or more of the following: 
facilitation of economic exchanges (Anand & Khanna, 2000), organizational learning 
(Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1996), product marketing (Swaminathan & Moorman, 
2009) or product innovation (Rothaermel, 2001a).  
 In addition to the purpose of the alliance, the literature has also recognized several 
levels on which alliances can help strengthen a firm’s competitive position, such as by 
gaining access to new capabilities (Oxley & Sampson, 2004; Rothaermel & Boeker, 
2008), access to new markets (Chen & Chen, 2002; Koka & Prescott, 2008), access to 
new assets (Huggins, 2010; Li, Eden, Hitt, & Ireland, 2008) including new knowledge 
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(Walter, Lechner, & Kellermanns, 2007), and enhanced reputation (Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, 
Arregle, & Borza, 2000), to name a few.  
 Because investors are looking for a way to recognize competitive advantages and 
future value, they are attempting to decode and interpret observable signals. In particular, 
explorative and exploitative signals lend itself for easier decoding and interpretation by 
investors because they each signal a distinct strategic direction of the organization.  
Exploration and exploitation  
 March (1991) defines exploration as searching, risk taking, discovery, innovation, and 
experimentation. Others would associate exploration with investment, building new 
capabilities, and entering new lines of business (Koza & Lewin, 1999), and some would 
define it simply as the pursuit of new knowledge (Rothaermel, 2001b). The term 
exploitation on the other hand more commonly refers to refinement, efficiency, 
production, selection and implementation (March, 1991). Firms that engage in 
exploitation are thought of as entities that focus more on economies of scale, using 
existing processes and knowledge to refine a product or process, but certainly do not 
consistently take high risk and explore the unknown. Some scholars have suggested that 
the strategic decision to explore or exploit is a trade-off decision (March, 2006); within 
one firm, one might prevent the other (Benner & Tushman, 2002; Sull, 1999). 
 However, it has also been suggested that entities might have to possess relevant skill 
to engage in both, exploring and exploiting, in order to be consistently successful (e.g. the 
ambidexterity argument) (Zi-Lin He & Poh-Kam Wong, 2004). Because of this 
(perceived) need to do both, exploring and exploiting, an alliance might be the ideal 
organizational structure that allows each firm to mainly focus on exploration or 
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exploitation, while the alliance as an entity has the ability to focus on both. I therefore 
state my hypotheses in terms of the combined expertise of both alliance partners, which 
then equals the expertise of the alliance. I identified three overarching areas containing 
relevant exploration / exploitation variables for this study: technical expertise, 
relationship expertise, and market expertise.  
 Alliances are capable of producing both explorative and exploitative innovations 
(Dewar & Dutton, 1986). Both explorative and exploitative innovations have the 
potential to affect the valuation of an alliance, although this shift in value is realized 
differently. Explorative innovations, the more risky approach according to March (1991), 
seek to significantly shift the basis of competition within an industry (Ireland, Hitt, & 
Sirmon, 2003). In this regard, an explorative innovation could radically shift power 
within an industry and catapult a firm to the top. It is a risky strategy, and in some regards 
similar to an “all or nothing” approach. If successful it might positively affect the 
trajectory of profits for the foreseeable future.  
 Exploitative innovations on the other hand are designed to help maximize existing 
capabilities (Sheremata, 2004). As a result, this strategy is less risky, and it has almost no 
chance of significantly affecting the competitive position of a firm within an industry, 
either positively or negatively, in the short run. However, exploitation should not be 
interpreted as the less-desirable strategy but rather as a different strategic direction; this 
might appeal to some investors. Because of the differing potential outcomes between 
exploration and exploitation, I suggest that the investor reaction based on these signals 
sent by the alliance will differ.  
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 Since exploration entails production of new knowledge and exploitation entails reuse, 
I examine how these approaches affect investor perceptions. Because alliances are 
designed to be able to engage in both exploration and exploitation, both may play a 
crucial part in a firm’s overall strategic direction. Subsequently, investors may see this 
and base their initial reaction to the alliance announcement on their assessment of how 
well an alliance is prepared to take advantage of any synergistic effects for which it was 
created. 
 Previous work on performance perception of alliances has focused largely on the 
signals that firms send to other potential partner-firms before the alliance is formed (the 
partner selection process). Partner selection issues in alliances have been studied 
extensively (Beckman, Haunschild, & Phillips, 2004; Dollinger, Golden, & Saxton, 1997; 
Hitt et al., 2000; Kale & Singh, 2009; Shah & Swaminathan, 2008). However, the 
literature has not focused as much on the issue of partner-specific skill sets (i.e. the 
combined set of expertise and skills) and the subsequent investor reaction to the signals 
sent to exogenous entities (i.e., investors).  
In an effort to more accurately predict the success of an alliance, prior studies have 
focused on several variables impacting alliance performance with a focus on resources 
that the partners bring into the alliance (Saxton, 1997). For example, alliance experience 
of a firm (Anand & Khanna, 2000; Dyer & Singh, 1998), reputation (Barney, 1991; R. 
Hall, 1992), or patent filings (Levitas & McFadyen, 2009), to name a few, have generally 
been viewed as predictors of future alliance success. Investors receive and decode signals 
in these variables. Therefore, once the alliance is announced, a desirable combination of 
partners can support the perception by investors that the alliance will act synergistically, 
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which would result in an increase in performance (Dyer et al., 2001). This in turn would 
explain the generally positive market reaction to alliance announcements.  
 Upon the announcement, investors identify, or at least believe that they have the 
ability to identify, the potential for future performance and reward the announcement 
with an appropriate reaction (positive or negative, depending on the investors’ 
interpretation of the signals). However, even though alliance announcements are 
generally met with a positive market reaction (Shah & Swaminathan, 2008), alliances 
also carry a significant risk in the form of failure to generate the positive effects they 
were designed and expected to create (i.e., a product with market success that will 
generate positive cash flows). Research suggests that a significant number of alliances, in 
fact between 30% and 70%, fail or are prematurely terminated (Bamford, Gomes-
Casseres, & Robinson, 2003; Lunnan & Haugland, 2008), leading to a destruction of 
shareholder value for the alliance partners (Kale et al., 2002). While alliance failure rates 
are not the focus of this study, these statistics underline the fact that because investors 
appear to positively over-react to the alliance announcements, more research into this 
subject is warranted. In other words, the question of what the alliance partners signal that 
gets the investors excited is relevant. 
 One of the main problems with evaluating the alliance at the time of the alliance 
announcement is the fact that the exogenous parties, the investors, have to overcome 
information asymmetry. The investors therefore rely on signals from the alliance (its 
member partners) before they, the investors, can react either positively or negatively to 
the announcement. Signaling theory (Spence, 1973; Spence, 1974) provides the 
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theoretical foundation for my study because it helps explain investor reaction to the 
alliance announcement in this environment of information asymmetry.  
 Exploration and exploitation affect the investors’ perception of the alliance, and 
subsequently its value, very differently. On a very basic level, I suggest that exploration 
signals a willingness to take risks, to change the current norm, and to seek new 
discoveries. These attitudes communicate a willingness to change the status quo, which in 
turn may cause investors to re-assess their previous valuation of a firm. Exploitation, on 
the other hand, may allow for a more consistent valuation because of the lack of any 
drastic changes. Exploitation generally does not attempt to change a status-quo in the 
short term, but rather focuses on strengthening existing capabilities. Those are two very 
different strategic directions, and I suggest that the alliances’ intention on which direction 
to take is signaled to the investors at the time of the announcements (when the partner-
combination is revealed). The new partner combination then forces investors to react.  
 Signaling theory states that even though the exogenous entities (e.g., investors) might 
not be able to fully understand exactly what the new alliance will do (meaning that 
information asymmetry exists), they will receive and interpret signals sent by the alliance 
partners, and subsequently consider the signals’ influence on the valuation of the alliance 
partners. This also suggests that alliance partners, knowing that investors may not be able 
to fully understand what the alliance will do (that is, how it will create value), have the 
opportunity to send very select signals that support a potential over-valuation at the time 
of the announcement. In this study, I will examine how the signals that I identified to be 
relevant are deciphered by the investors. I use the investors’ immediate reaction around 
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the time of the alliance announcement (t=[-1, 0, 1]) as a proxy for their interpretation of 
the signals. 
 As mentioned above, finding the right partner is a critical step in leading an alliance 
onto a path toward future success. A significant number of studies have addressed the 
issue of partner selection, especially on partner skills and resource complementarity 
(Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 2001; Ohmae, 1989).  The concept of 
complementary skills specifically refers to different skills that partners bring into the 
alliance, with the assumption that one partner’s different skills such as abilities, 
knowledge, organizational design, experience, etc., are then strategically used to offset 
possible weaknesses of the other partner. I am assuming that alliance partners make a 
strategic decision on which partner to choose, with the result that the corresponding 
partner combination of skills does not result by chance. Rather a conscious decision led 
to the specific combination. These decisions are observed, and the final selection of 
partners is then interpreted and acted upon by investors.  
Technical Expertise  
 It has been suggested that inputs carry a signal to the investors about the potential 
future results of the alliance (Ahuja & Morris Lampert, 2001).  The investors observe the 
inputs, come to a conclusion about potential outputs, and react long before potential 
outputs could lead to measurable profits. As a result, I create a variable that encompasses 
inputs of different dimensions of technical expertise of the two alliance partners.  
 In this study I will consider whether the technical expertise of the partners, proxied by 
the resources the partners bring into the alliance in the form of patents, are explorative or 
exploitative. Technical expertise refers to a firm’s understanding of the technology 
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underlying its goods or services (Grant, 1996), and patents are a proxy for technical 
expertise. I will use the relative, partner specific, technological overlap of the combined 
inputs, the patent citations, as an indication of whether the technical expertise of the 
alliance is exploratory or exploitative.  
  However, it is not clear exactly how the investors interpret the signals. As outlined 
above, both exploration and exploitation can lead to value creation in the future, which 
would manifest itself through perceived value at the time of the alliance announcement 
(i.e. the investor reaction). The question becomes which type of value creation 
(explorative or exploitative) the investor is looking for, and how much risk the investor is 
willing to take.  A positive reaction to an alliance featuring either exploratory inputs or 
exploitative inputs is possible, because the reaction is somewhat subjective.  As a result, I 
suggest two competing hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1A: The higher the degree of combined explorative technical expertise of 
the alliance partners, the higher the investors’ perception of value  
 
Hypothesis 1B: The higher the degree of combined exploitative technical expertise of 
the alliance partners, the higher the investors’ perception of value 
Relationship expertise 
 When investors consider the specific partners involved in an alliance, they are 
interested in partner combinations that have the potential to reach explicitly stated or 
implied future performance goals (e.g., form an alliance with the goal of developing a 
cancer treatment). I identify three reasons that the degree to which alliance partners know 
each other may influence the achievement of a goal and subsequently the alliance 
performance, and thus will impact the investors’ perception of the value creation of a new 
alliance at the time of the announcement.  
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 First: efficient knowledge transfer.  A stronger familiarity with the alliance partner 
increases the efficiency of knowledge transfer (Cohen, 2009; Kogut & Zander, 1992; 
Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1998). In other words, certain alliance partner 
combinations signal to the investors that they, the alliance partners, have the potential 
ability to communicate and transfer vital information between each other efficiently. 
Second: knowledge of organizational routines. Prior alliance experience can potentially 
reduce inefficiencies between the partners because the partners are familiar with, for 
example, each other’s routines and culture, and can thus reduce transaction costs 
(Beckman et al., 2004; Parkhe, 1993). In other words, this combination of alliance 
partners has the potential to get the job done more efficiently, or without significant loss 
of resources. Third: trust. Prior experience with each other increases trust, which in turn 
will reduce the firms’ temptation to act unilaterally and, at the same time, increase the 
likelihood that partners will share crucial information with each other in a timely manner 
(Li et al., 2008). The question therefore is: do the partners know each other, and if so, 
how well? 
 Based on these relationship indicators, I suggest that the degree to which alliance 
partners know each other (and know how the other partner works) will trigger an investor 
response. Li et al. (2008) suggested that there are three different types of firms from 
which to choose an alliance partner, and which signal to the market whether the 
relationship is explorative (new) or exploitative (not new). Those categories of partners 
are: close friend, acquaintance or stranger (Li et al., 2008). Friends are firms with which 
the focal firm has worked in the recent past and has done so more than once. 
Acquaintances are partners with which the focal firm has worked before, but not recently 
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and not continuously. In the context of partner relationships, both friends and 
acquaintances may be categorized as exploitative partner choices.  Strangers are partner 
firms with which the focal firm has not worked before, and as a result on which it has 
very limited (only secondary) information. Selecting a stranger as alliance partner would 
be considered an explorative partner choice.  
 In this study I will consider three specific variables that in their own way address the 
issue of relationships status. All three variables proxy the likelihood of information 
asymmetry between partners, which has the potential to lead to inefficiencies. The 
potential for inefficiencies may be viewed as a negative signal by investors at the time of 
the alliance announcement. Number of prior partnerships will address specifically how 
often the partners have worked together in the past. Time proximity to last partnership 
introduces a time component; if the partners have recently worked together it would 
suggest that organizational routines as well as the external environment have changed 
less than if the last time both partners worked together was well in the past. Time 
proximity would suggest that both partners would have to expend fewer resources to 
align organizational routines. Thus, the longer the time horizon since the last partnership, 
the greater the possibility that inefficiencies might occur. Third, since there are different 
types of alliances (e.g., marketing, R&D, etc.), the investors’ reaction to the alliance 
announcement should consider the partners’ relevant history in the type of the focal 
alliance. Therefore, the alliance-type specific partner experience is the third variable of 
consideration.  
 Exploitation, calculated across the three dimensions I suggested, would refer to a 
scenario where the partners know each other well and signal to the investors that there is 
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a potential for efficiencies based on a prior relationship. Simply put, the partners know 
each other well, have “done it” before, and are willing and able to capitalize on the 
potential synergies that the relationship offers. This could be interpreted as a positive 
signal, which would have the potential to trigger a positive investor reaction.  
 While it is true that firms are likely to call upon previous alliance partners (Gulati, 
1995; Uzzi, 1997), this does not necessarily suggest that working with a new partner 
doesn’t offer benefits as well. An explorative relationship can offer other benefits, such 
as the possibility of reducing inertial tendencies between partners (Sx & Rowley, 2002). 
Inertia between partners who have a history of working with each other might set in, and 
as a result the alliance partners might not be able or willing to implement necessary 
changes to, for example, the strategic approach to a given problem.  Especially in 
industries like the pharmaceutical industry, breaking away from an existing relationship 
might carry benefits that the alliance would signal to investors. As a result, it might be the 
fact that an alliance consist of partners that have not worked together before (who would 
be categorized as strangers) that sends the desired signals to the investors.  
 Because alliances that are explorative with respect to relationship expertise, as well as 
those that are exploitative, have potential benefits and drawbacks, investors could 
potentially react positively to either partner choice. Either choice of partner carries a 
signal. Exploitative partner selection (close friends or acquaintances) signal efficiencies.  
Explorative partner (strangers) selection reduces the potential for inertia, which could 
also signal efficiencies. Because a reaction suggesting perceived value recognition by the 
investor could be triggered by either an explorative or exploitative partner choice, I 
suggest two competing hypotheses:  
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Hypothesis 2A: The higher the degree of combined explorative relationship expertise 
of the alliance partners, the higher the investors’ perception of value.  
 
Hypothesis 2B: The higher the degree of combined exploitative relationship expertise 
of the alliance partners, the higher the investors’ perception of value.  
 
Market expertise 
 Whereas in the biopharmaceutical industry technical expertise specifically refers to an 
alliance’s ability to generate or create the desired therapy, the market expertise variable 
specifically addresses the alliance’s ability to navigate the therapy through the process 
and into the market where, ultimately, profits are expected to be generated. Therefore, 
this area of expertise might also send a strong and relevant signal to investors, who are 
attempting to detect and forecast future profits.  
 One ultimate goal of an alliance may be to produce a marketable product that will 
positively affect future cash flows. In the pharmaceutical industry, any product has to be 
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (hereafter: FDA) before it can be 
marketed and sold in the United States. The FDA approval process is complicated and 
resource consuming. It is therefore critical that firms that plan to have a new patent 
approved for sale by the FDA understand the distinct FDA approval process. The process 
consists of six critical approval stages, each designed to expose a different sample to the 
drug1. Along each stage, the firm has to prove that the drug actually does what it 
advertises; in other words, if a drug is said to reduce the risk for cancer, a study involving 
humans has to eventually prove this claim before the FDA would approve the drug.  
                                                          
1 I divide the drug development process in to six stages: (1) preclinical stage, (2) the filing of an 
Investigational New Drug Application (or a Biologic License Application), (3)  Phase 1, (4)  Phase 2, (5) 
Phase 3, and (6) marketed 
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 Organizational capabilities, such as learning, play a large role in generating superior 
performance (Nelson & Winter, 1982). The best way to learn the FDA approval process 
is by going through it and gaining expertise, or partnering with someone that has 
extensive experience in the process. The experience curve would suggest that efficiencies 
improve with experience; the direct experience is invaluable (Sampson, 2005). As a 
result, I suggest that alliance partners that have experience with the specific process will 
be more efficient in managing the process.  
 However, while the ability to manage the FDA approval process is absolutely vital, it 
is not enough to be successful. In other words, investors are looking for additional signals 
that would suggest that the alliance deserves a positive reaction at the time of the 
announcement. Complementary assets, defined as assets, infrastructure or capabilities 
vital to the success of a project, are needed to be successful; complementary assets can 
propel a firm from having failed despite experience in the FDA process, to having 
experienced success. Tripsas (1997) specifically states that commercial performance, 
which investors are interested in, hinges on the organizational structure’s ability to use 
complementary assets. The alliance is again an organizational structure that allows for the 
relatively easy introduction of these assets into the partnership by simply choosing a 
partner that has the desired expertise.  
 In this study, I pay special attention to the degree of FDA approval process 
experience and FDA approval success by the partners. Process experience would suggest 
that a partner has at least tried to get a therapy approved and, therefore, has some 
experience with the bureaucratic and scientific hurdles that this process encompasses. 
Having had success in the FDA approval process, however, is rare; between 2003 and 
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2010 only about 10% of all drugs submitted were actually approved by the FDA 
(Business Wire, 2011).  
 Together, having all necessary assets to have experience and success, creates a 
construct that sends a signal to exogenous entities about specific FDA approval process 
experience. Rationally the investors should value experience in this category. However, 
to make sure I also test the scenario in which the alliance does not have experience in 
bringing a product to market: 
 
Hypothesis 3A: The higher the degree of combined explorative market expertise of the 
alliance partners, the higher the investors’ perception of value.  
 
Hypothesis 3B: The higher the degree of combined exploitative market expertise of 
the alliance partners, the higher the investors’ perception of value.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
Sample 
I am using a sample of bilateral alliances that include biotech firms and 
pharmaceutical companies. I coded them as Client and R&D to indicate the relationship, 
where generally the larger pharmaceutical company represents the Client firm and the 
smaller biotech firm represents the R&D partner. I chose this industry because alliances 
are a very common organizational form, where partners are likely to work with each 
other numerous times. In addition, this industry relies heavily on patent protection for its 
products. As outlined above, patent citations send very rich signals about the technical 
expertise of the alliance partners.  
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All patent information was obtained from the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER) Patent Citations database (B. H. Hall, Jaffe, Trajtenberg, & Centre for Economic 
Policy Research (Great Britain), 2001), and the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office’s (USPTO) Cassis database. Additional data was taken from Compustat data files, 
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) U.S. stock database, the Recombinant 
Capital Biotechnology Database (ReCap), the IMS R&D Focus database, Spectrum 
Institutional Ownership files, and United States Securities and Exchange (SEC) proxy 
(DEF 14a) filings.  
The initial sample included 28,470 biopharmaceutical alliances established between 
January 1st, 1989 and December 31st, 2008. I used the Wharton Research Data Services 
(WRDS), and specifically the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database, to 
determine which alliances include both biotech firms and pharmaceutical firms that were 
publicly traded at the end of the month of the event date. Because the initial data only 
indicated the month on which the alliance was announced, I further refined the event date 
(date of the alliance announcement) by performing a web search on each partner 
combination in the stated month. This search produced specific alliance announcements, 
which allowed me to define the exact date of the announcement. This date was then used 
to construct the three day window to measure the dependent variable. This data set 
includes 927 alliance events with exactly two partners that were both publicly traded at 
the time of the event date. Data availability constraints limited the final sample use in 
Model 2 of the analysis to 200 alliance events.  
Measures 
Dependent Variable 
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 Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR): The dependent variable is the sum of the 
abnormal stock returns (CAR) of the biotech firm around the time of the alliance 
announcement. CAR represents the deviation between the realized return, measured by 
the biotech firm’s actual stock price movement, and the expected return of the biotech 
firm’s stock performance.  CAR has been used extensively as a performance measure in 
joint venture event studies (Gulati, Lavie, & Singh, 2009; Koh & Venkatraman, 1991; 
Park & Kim, 1997; Reuer & Koza, 2000) and as a dependent variable in alliance studies 
(Anand & Khanna, 2000).  
 I calculated the expected return by using a benchmark portfolio comprised of size-
adjusted firms that match the 2-digit SIC code of the sample industry. I monitored the 
return during a three-day window [-1, 0, 1] around the alliance announcement of both the 
portfolio and the biotech firm (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997), and calculated the 
cumulative difference over the three days as the difference between the two cumulative 
returns. The short three-day window was chosen in an attempt to isolate the news of the 
alliance announcement and help prevent the inclusion of non-alliance related news in the 
movement of the securities [see for example Lee et al.(2000)], thus following the 
argument of market efficiency. I then matched the calculated CAR values by firm ID and 
date to the 927 alliance events in my sample.  
Independent Variables 
 Technical Expertise: I measured the technical expertise held by the alliance partners 
as a ratio, indicating the level of the commonly held knowledge of the alliance. While 
prior studies have used R&D intensity as a measure of technological capabilities (Cohen 
& Levinthal, 1989; Mowery et al., 1996), Mowery et al. (1998) pointed out that R&D 
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intensity is an input measure while patents are an output measure that more accurately 
reflect technology-based capabilities. 
Following Mowery et al. (1996) and their use of a cross-citation rate of patents, I am 
measuring the technological expertise of the alliance as:  
(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑜𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑜𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠 ) 
where the common patent citations of both partners is the number of patents that both 
partners cite in their own patents, and total citations of both partners is the sum of the 
totals of both partners’ citations. The result is a ratio of patent citation overlap that is an 
indicator of the technical expertise of the newly announced alliance.  
The formula above should be interpreted as follows: a move toward a higher patent 
citation overlap relative to the total number of patent citations of both partners, indicated 
by an increase in the value of the ratio, suggests a greater technological overlap of the 
alliance partners because a higher percentage of the total patents (knowledge) of both 
partners cite the same previously patented technological expertise.  The result is that an 
increase in the value of the ratio is a shift toward an exploitative technical expertise of the 
alliance since the alliance partners bring less patented knowledge into the alliance that is 
new to the other partner.  
The opposite, a decrease in the value of the ratio suggests a move toward a lower 
patent citation overlap, indicating that the knowledge brought into the alliance by both 
partners overlaps less. This in turn suggests that the technological expertise of each 
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partner vis-à-vis the other is less redundant, and as a result the technical expertise of the 
alliance is more explorative.  
 To summarize, an increasing value of shared technical expertise suggests a move 
toward a more exploitative technical expertise, whereas a decreasing value suggests a 
move toward a more explorative technical expertise of the alliance.  
 Relationship expertise: I measure the degree to which the alliance partners know 
each other based on three firm indicators that the management literature suggests 
determine the type of relationship between two alliance partners: 1) prior alliance partner 
experience (Li et al., 2008; Sampson, 2005) , 2) recency of prior alliance experiences 
(Villalonga & McGahan, 2005), and 3) prior experience in the specific type of alliance 
(i.e. R&D, marketing, etc.) (Sampson, 2005).  
 In the following section I briefly outline each of these three indicators as well as how 
I coded the Relationship Expertise variable used in the analysis. 
 Prior alliance-partner relationship: This variable indicates whether the two partner 
firms have worked with each other in an alliance before, and if so, how often. The 
argument for inclusion of this measure is that a stronger familiarity with the alliance 
partner should increase the efficient transfer of knowledge (Cohen, 2009; Kogut & 
Zander, 1992; Mowery et al., 1998) and thus lead to a higher probability of inventive 
success.  
 I proxied the firm’s alliance level experience with the partner by the number of 
previous collaborations, using the original dataset of 28,740 alliances. I calculated this 
variable as the cumulative sum of all prior alliances with the same partner. The variable 
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is a discrete quantitative variable expressed as the number of previous collaborations, not 
including the current alliance. The data revealed that the range in my sample is from 0 – 
6.  
 An increase in this variable suggests that the partners have stronger familiarity with 
each other, whereas a decrease in this variable would suggest that the partners have less 
familiarity with each other. Consequently, an increase in this variable is a shift toward a 
more exploitative relationship since partners most likely will use previously established 
organizational relationships (Gulati et al., 2009),  while a decrease in this variable is a 
shift toward a more explorative relationship.  
 Recency of prior alliance experience with same partner: This variable indicates how 
recent the partners’ last cooperation was and is expressed in days. It is meant to capture 
the degree to which organizational structures may have changed since the last cooperative 
relationship between the partners, where it is assumed that a more intimate knowledge of 
the organizational structures of the alliance partner may lead to more efficiency.   
 This variable is expressed as a discrete quantitative variable in days since the last 
relationship, using the original dataset of 28,740 alliances. Many partner combinations 
have never worked with each other, which may be viewed as an extreme unfamiliarity 
with the partner’s organization structures. I chose to assign an arbitrary value of 10,000 
(days) to those alliances to reflect fact that the partners have no first-hand knowledge of 
working with each other. I chose to take the inverse (1/X) of the number of days since the 
last partnership. By doing so I transformed the variable into a smaller range (from 0 – 1), 
and I coded the variable so that an increase in this variable suggests a more recent 
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experience (which will be in line with all other indicator variables where an increase 
suggests an exploitative relationship with the partner).   
 The result is a variable that indicates the recency of the previous experience with the 
same partner, where an increase in the value of this variable suggests a more recent 
experience and consequently a more exploitative relationship. Conversely, a decrease in 
the value of this variable signals a shift toward a more unfamiliar relationship, which may 
be considered explorative.  
 Alliance-type specific partner experience: This variable is an extension of the 
previous two variables. It indicates whether the partner firms have worked together in the 
specific type of the focal alliance before. I define the different types as, for example, 
R&D alliances, marketing alliances, licensing alliance, supply alliance, etc.  
 I used the original dataset of 28,740 alliances and counted how often the two partners 
in a focal alliance worked together in the specific type of alliance. This is a discrete 
quantitative variable with a range from 0 – 5. 
 An increase in the value of this variable suggests a move toward a more exploitative 
relationship because the relationship becomes both less new and less rare. A decrease in 
this variable suggests a move towards a more explorative relationship because the type of 
alliance relationship is new or rare.  
 The final Relationship Expertise variable, which I used in my regression analysis, is 
the sum of the three relationship variables described above. I chose to use the sum 
because I found no evidence in the literature that one indicator ought to be weighted more 
heavily than another.  
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 Market expertise: I measured two indicators that together represent the market 
expertise of the alliance: 1) the sum of the individual experience of the partners with the 
FDA approval process, and 2) the sum of the individual success of the partners in moving 
a product from one stage to the next (and subsequently closer to market approval).  
 FDA approval process experience: As mentioned earlier, the FDA approval process 
consists of six distinct stages through which the firm needs to move the therapy through 
before it can be marketed. FDA approval process experience can be gained on two 
dimensions. First, experience over time in the same stage. If a firm has had prior 
experience working with a therapy in, for example, the pre-clinical stage (stage 1), it 
influences the firms action working with future therapies in stage 1 and should therefore 
considered as expertise dealing with stage 1 of the FDA approval process.  
 Using the original data set with 28,740 alliances, I counted the number of times that 
each partner in each alliance has had a therapy in one of the six stages in the past (based 
on the alliance announcement date) and summed those up. As a result, each alliance 
partner in each alliance has a sum of prior experiences in each of the six distinct stages of 
the FDA approval process.  
 The second dimension is the experience across stages, and a decision as to how to 
add up the numbers representing the prior experience within each of the six distinct FDA 
stages had to be made.  I tested for correlation between the six cumulative variables 
(stages) for each firm at each date, and found a high degree of correlation. In fact, all 
bivariate correlations were statistically significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test). 
Because the literature dealing with FDA approval stages does not indicate if one stage 
should receive a greater weight when creating an index, and because of the correlations I 
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found, I followed Grice (2001), who suggested using the factor scoring coefficients of a 
principle components analysis (PCA) as weights when creating an index. I performed a 
PCA to compute the factor scoring coefficients and used those as weights in computing 
the Market Expertise variable for each firm at each alliance date. Specifically, the 
weights are: 
 = (S1 x 0.188) + (S2 x 0.132) + (S3 x 0.192) + (S4 x 0.202) x (S5 x 0.188) + (S6 x 0.196) 
where S stands for the stage in the approval process. The result is one indicator of prior 
FDA approval experience for each firm. I then added up the values of the two partners, 
resulting in an indicator of prior FDA approval experience for the alliance. An increase in 
this indicator suggests more experience, making the experience exploitative, whereas a 
decrease in this indicator suggests a movement toward a newer experience, making the 
experience explorative.  
  FDA approval process success: This second indicator of market expertise 
indicates whether the alliance partners have previously had any success moving a therapy 
from one stage of the approval process to the next. Given the very small percentage of 
therapies that actually gain final FDA approval, and the large percentage of therapies that 
never moved beyond the initial stage, I coded any movement from one stage to the next 
as success, using the original data set of 28,740 alliances. Because success is rare, I 
assumed that when it happens, it significantly influences the firms’ market experience. As 
a result, I did not restrict when in the past the success occurred. Next, I summed up all 
successful movements of the alliance partners in prior alliances. 
 The resulting indicator may be interpreted as follows: an increase in the success value 
suggests more previous success, which may be interpreted as exploitative (because 
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having success is then not as new to the firms).  A decrease in the value of this variable 
suggests that success is a more a newer experience for the firms, which may be 
interpreted as a more explorative. 
 The variable used in the analysis, Market Expertise, is the product of FDA approval 
process experience and FDA approval process success. Given the amount of resources it 
takes to succeed in the FDA approval process, I chose to multiply the variables so as to 
assign a greater value to an alliance with partners that have experience and success. 
Additionally, by multiplying these two variables I recognize the rarity of success. This 
approach puts a greater quantitative distance between those who are not at all, marginally 
or very successful. 
Control Variables 
 Firm size: I control for firm size because prior research suggests that firm size may 
explain R&D expenditures and firm performance (Levitas & McFadyen, 2009). R&D 
expenditures are especially relevant in this study because of this potential correlation with 
exploration and exploitation, and firm performance may be correlated to CAR. I used the 
natural log of the R&D firms’ total assets as of December 31st of the year prior to the 
alliance date, which captures both tangible and intangible assets. Biotechnology firms 
often do not carry significant tangible assets but rather intangible assets (Rothaermel & 
Deeds, 2006), and patents are a form of intangible assets.  
 Industry environment: I created an industry index based on the Lerner Index (Lerner, 
1994) as an indicator of the industry's willingness and ability to fund R&D projects in the 
biotech industry (Levitas & McFadyen, 2009). Willingness and ability to fund R&D 
projects greatly depend on the macroeconomic environment and industry outlook. There 
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is less funding available during economic downturns as companies and investors retract 
from engaging in risky endeavors, such as R&D.  This retraction would then be 
measurable in this index; hence this measure is an appropriate proxy for the 
macroeconomic environment for the purpose of this study.  
 I calculated the index by using the month-end share price of common stock of a 
random sample of 12 biopharmaceutical companies from January 31st, 1989 to December 
31st, 2008 and set January 31st 1989 to 1.000, resulting in a total of 240 industry values. I 
then matched those to the alliance date by using the industry index from the month 
ending prior to the alliance date.  
 Firm Age: To control for firm age is appropriate because the older the firm, the 
higher the probability that it had partnered with others in the past or had engaged in the 
patenting and FDA approval process. Therefore age influences many of the independent 
variables described above. Firm age is measured in years since the firm’s founding 
(Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006), and I included the age of other partners in the analysis.   
 Number of current, active alliances: I used the original data set of 28,470 alliances 
and counted the total number of alliances for the Client firm in the two partner alliances.  
Because termination dates of alliances are usually not available, I only considered 
alliances that were three years or younger at the time of the event as active.  
Model and Estimation 
 I tested the three sets of hypotheses using a linear mixed regression analysis that 
examines the effect of (1) the technical expertise of the alliance, (2) the relationship 
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expertise of the alliance, and (3) the marketing expertise of the alliance on the cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) of the R&D partner in a two-firm alliance.   
 In addition to the three independent variables, I included a size variable, an industry 
index indicating the funding availability within the focal industry at the time of the 
alliance, an age variable, as well as a measure indicating the number of active alliances of 
the partner firms as control variables in the regression analysis.  
 In the sample of 927 alliances, 382 firms account for the (2 x 927 =) 1,854 partners 
involved in the alliances. 155 firms appear only once in the sample while one firm 
appears 53 times. Because of the unbalanced nature of the sample, as well as the likely 
presence of between-subject (firm) specific effects, a standard estimation method would 
not be appropriate.  
 To adjust for the characteristics of the sample, I used a linear mixed model design to 
execute the regression analysis that allows the subjects (firms) to differ from one another 
(Maxwell & Delaney, 2004). This approach allowed me to introduce random effects for 
each of the partner firms. Table 3 shows the fixed effects data estimation (within subject 
estimation) while accounting for the between-subjects firm effects. Parameters were 
estimated by the method of maximum likelihood using Proc Mixed in SAS 9.3. 
RESULTS 
 I first tested for the presence of cumulative abnormal returns by testing whether the 
mean of the dependent variable is statistically different from 0. A T-Test confirmed that 
CAR  is statistically significant different from 0 at ∝ = 0.05 (one-sample t(456) = 5.155, 
p < 0.0001) with a mean difference from 0 of 0.055, confirming previous studies (Dyer et 
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al., 2001; Shah & Swaminathan, 2008) that the stock market reacts positively to alliance 
announcements. 
 A close examination of CAR showed that the dependent variable and its residuals, are 
not normally distributed. As a result, I transformed the variable using a natural log (ln) 
transformation. I confirmed the successful transformation by visually inspecting the Q-Q 
plot as well as the P-P plot and deemed the dependent variable as well as the residuals 
approximately normal.  
 To assess the threat of collinearity I estimated the variance inflation factors (VIF) and 
found none to be great than 1.8. Prior studies cite different cutoff values, and I went with 
a conservative cutoff value of 10 (H. Y. Lee, 2011). As a result I conclude that no linear 
dependency among the independent variables exists.  
 Definitions of variables and the full model specifications are shown in Table 1. 
Descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix used in this study are provided in Table 2. 
The results of the linear mixed regression analysis are reported in Table 3, where Model 1 
serves as the base model, including only the control variables, while Model 2 includes 
technical expertise, relationship expertise, and market expertise.   
 A likelihood ratio test, comparing model 1 to model 2, produced a chi-square statistic 
(χ2 = 113.2, 3 d.f.) above the critical value of 7.815. The resulting log likelihood ratio 
suggests that the addition of the three independent variables in Model 2 significantly 
improves the model fit.  
  Hypotheses 1A and 1B suggest that investors will react to an alliance’s signal of 
technical expertise. I found no evidence of a statistically significant relationship between 
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the technical expertise of the alliance partners and CAR. As a result, I reject both 
hypotheses 1A and 1B.  
 Hypotheses 2A and 2B suggest that investors will react to the alliance’s signal of 
relationship expertise. Specifically, hypothesis 2A suggests that investors react positively 
to the combined explorative relationship expertise of the alliance partners. The results 
provide statistical support for this hypothesis. The negative regression coefficient (-.000) 
indicates that as relationship expertise decreases (a shift towards exploration), investors’ 
perception of value (proxied by CAR) increases (p<0.001). As a result of hypothesis 2A 
being supported, I reject hypothesis 2B, which suggested that investors react positively to 
exploitative relationship expertise (which would have been evidenced by a positive 
regression coefficient).  
 Hypotheses 3A and 3B suggest that investors will react to the alliance’s signal of 
market expertise. Specifically, hypothesis 3A suggests that there is a positive relationship 
between the combined explorative market expertise of the alliance partners and the 
investors’ perception of value. For this to be the case, I would expect a statistically 
significant p-value with a negative regression coefficient, which is not the case (the 
regression coefficient is positive). As a result, I reject Hypothesis 3A.  
 Hypothesis 3B proposes that the combined exploitative relationship expertise of the 
alliance partners would positively affect the investors’ perception of value. I did find 
statistically significant evidence to support hypothesis 3B. The correlation coefficient is 
positive (.000), indicating exploitation, and the p-value of 0.059 indicates marginal 
statistical significance at the 0.1 level.  
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 This study examined the causes of investors’ reaction to alliance announcements. The 
underlying assumption of this study is that alliance announcements lead to an increase in 
stock market valuation of the participating firms, which then allowed me to investigate 
possible determinants. With a focus on the R&D partner, I confirmed that the sample in 
this study showed this characteristic, which allowed me to proceed and test three 
independent variables and their effect (signal) on the investors’ perception of value.  
 The empirical portion of this study tested three sets of competing hypothesis that the 
management literature has not previously addressed. Interestingly, this study found no 
support for the first set of hypotheses that the technical expertise of alliance partners 
carries decodable signals to investors, as evidenced by the lack of statistically significant 
regression results (hypotheses 1A and 1B). Technical expertise in particular, which 
speaks to the ability of the alliance to create measurable results (in the form of patents) 
that could impact the future returns of the firm, should send rich signals to the investors.  
Especially in an environment of information asymmetry, I suggested that investors are 
eager to receive and decode signals that may allow them to more accurately predict the 
probability of future success of the alliance.  
 There may be several reasons for the lack of statistically significant findings, and, as 
such, implications for future research. First, given how potentially noisy this particular 
signal may be (given the vast number of patent citations that need to be coded to 
specifically match both firms), investors may simply not have enough time or the ability 
to decode this variable and then react in a timely manner to the alliance announcement. A 
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future study may consider isolating this variable and introducing a moderator so as to test 
whether this lack of statistically significant findings holds under different conditions. 
Second, given the large number of alliance failures, investors may consciously choose not 
to consider this particular signal of technical expertise. Their internal evaluation model 
may have discredited this signal as unreliable as a predictor of future success.  
 The second set of hypotheses found that investors prefer alliance partner 
combinations with less previous work experience with each other (exploration) over 
alliances in which the partners have had a higher number of previous collaborations with 
each other (exploitation). These findings seem to contradict prior studies which suggest 
that efficient knowledge transfer (Cohen, 2009; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Mowery et al., 
1998), knowledge of organizational routines (Beckman et al., 2004; Parkhe, 1993), and 
trust between partners  (Li et al., 2008) are important indicators of organizational 
efficiencies, and thus may lead to a higher probability of success. Investors appear to 
value the possibility and benefit of reduced inertia between partners more highly than any 
other efficiencies that multiple collaborations would result in, as previous studies have 
suggested (Sx & Rowley, 2002). 
 In fact, the findings may suggest several things. First, could it be possible that 
investors believe that efficient knowledge transfer, knowledge of organizational routines, 
and trust between partners may not be positively related to the number of collaborations.  
Second, the findings suggest that investors like to take risk because an explorative 
relationship is by definition more risky than an exploitative relationship. One avenue for 
a future study would be to focus on the risk averseness of investors and introduce this 
concept into a follow-up study. Third, because exploration suggests a divergence from 
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previous activities, and because of the high failure rates of alliances, investors may 
interpret this signal as a firm-level reassessment of previous performance, and thus as a 
sign that firms are trying to correct previous strategic decisions that may have led to 
failures. This, then, would be in line with previous studies that suggest that firms get 
better by learning from previous experiences (Sampson, 2005), which in this case could 
mean to not work with the same partner again but rather focus on explorative (new) 
relationships. 
 The last set of findings pertaining to hypotheses 3A and 3B informs us about the 
investors’ preference regarding the combined FDA-specific approval process experience 
and success. The analysis found that investors prefer alliances with more FDA approval 
process experience and success (exploitation) over alliances with less experience and 
success (exploration). These findings support prior studies that linked experience and 
learning to superior performances (Nelson & Winter, 1982). Given the high number of 
alliance failures, these findings support the notion that investors would value the process-
specific experience and prior success of alliance partners.  
 Despite its contributions, this study is not without limitations. For example, the three-
day window around the alliance announcement might not be enough time for investors to 
consider the patenting activity of each partner and the resulting combined technical 
expertise. A bigger window might possibly lead to different findings. However, a bigger 
window would also increase the possibility of non-alliance related events influencing the 
stock price of the focal firm (such as, for example, a dividend announcement, or a change 
in the top management team of the focal firm). 
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 In conclusion, this study contributes to the field’s understanding of determinants of 
investors’ perception of value of alliance formations. The emphasis on technical 
expertise, relationship expertise, and marketing expertise, where each variable is coded 
along a continuum from exploration to exploitation, is a unique perspective that in this 
form has not been explored in the management literature.    
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Table 1: Definition of variables and model specifications 
Variable Name Definition 
  
CAR (R&D) The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) of the R&D partner, calculated 
using a portfolio of firms with the same 2-digit SIC code, adjusted for 
size and transformed (natural log) to adjust for non-normality of the data 
and the residuals.  
Technical Expertise An indicator of the technical expertise of the two partner firms in the 
focal alliance based on patent citation overlap. A low value indicates 
exploration, a high value indicates exploitation.  
Relationship 
Expertise  
An index describing the level of relationship experience between the two 
partners, calculated as = (Frequency) + (Recency) + (ATSPE); a low 
value indicates exploration, a high value indicates exploitation. 
     Frequency The number or frequency of prior alliance relationships between the two 
firms 
     Recency The recency (in days) of the last alliance relationship between the two. If 
the two partners have not worked before I set the value to 10,000 
     ATSPE The alliance type specific partner experience, indicating if these two 
firms have worked together in this type of alliance before.  
Market Expertise An index describing the FDA approval process experience of the alliance 
partners at the time of the alliance date, calculated as ((C-MKT-Index + 
RD-MKT-Index) x (Alliance Success)). A low value indicates 
exploration, a high value indicates exploitation. 
     C-MKT-Index The cumulative FDA approval process experience of the Client firm in 
each stage of the process and across all stages at the time of the alliance.  
     RD-MKT-Index The cumulative FDA approval process experience of the R&D firm in 
each stage of the process and across all stages at the time of the alliance.  
     Alliance Success The cumulative FDA approval success of the two partners.  
Size (R&D) Control variable, the natural log of total assets of the R&D firm 
Industry Environment Control variable, an industry index proxying the funding availability in 
the focal industry.  
Age (Client) Control variable, the age of the client firm from the firm’s founding to 
the alliance date. 
Age (R&D) Control variable, the age of the R&D firm from the firm’s founding to 
the alliance date 
Active Alliances 
(Client) 
Control variable, the number of current active alliances of the client firm 
as of the event date. 
 
Hypothesis Model Specification(s) 
  
H1, H2, H3 CAR =  (Technical Expertise) + (Relationship Expertise)  +  (Market Expertise)  
+ (R&D Size) + (Industry Environment) + (Client Age) + (R&D Age) + (Client 
Active Alliances) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
             Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 CAR -.68 .29 1 
        2 Technical Expertise .42 .49 .080 1 
       3 Relationship Expertise -8704.14 3219.58 -.270** -.064 1 
      4 Marketing Expertise 509.82 1133.40 .120* .068 -.038 1 
     5 Size (R&D) 4.65 1.87 .018 .040 .027 -.037 1 
    6 Industry Index 1.46 .31 .013 .042 .044 .007 .021 1 
   7 Age (Client) 88.04 226.44 .000 -.008 -.042 -.036 .001 -.065* 1 
  8 Age (R&D) 20.05 94.44 .004 .056 -.006 -.020 -.013 .015 -.002 1 
 9 Active Alliances (Client) 28.45 28.29 -.016 .049 -.022 -.007 .214** -.053 .006 -.020 1 
 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 3: Maximum Likelihood estimates on CAR of Technical Expertise, 
Relationship Expertise and Market Expertise 
     
 
Model 1 Model 2 
Explanatory Variable CAR CAR 
     Intercept -0.674 (0.080)*** -0.966 (0.103)*** 
Technical Expertise   0.015 (0.033) 
Relationship Expertise   -0.000 (0.000)*** 
Marketing Expertise   0.000 (0.000)† 
Size (R&D) 0.005 (0.007) 0.007 (0.008) 
Industry Index 0.001 (0.047) 0.077 (0.054) 
Age (Client) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 
Age (R&D) -0.001 (0.000) -0.001 (0.000)* 
Active Alliances (Client) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 
 
    Log-likelihood ratio 87.5 
 
-25.7 
 Log-likelihood ratio vs. Model 1 
  
113.2 *** 
Number of events 347   200   
 
    Standard errors appear in parentheses 
†p<0.10; *p>0.05; **p>0.01; ***p>0.001 
 
 
 
  
45 
 
 
REDUCING INVESTOR ANXIETY VIA ALLIANCE PARTNER SELECTION 
 
 
46 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Alliances have held a prominent place in the management literature, and their 
importance has been widely acknowledged (Kale & Singh, 2009). A significant amount 
of research has focused on reasons for alliance formations, which include, among others, 
access to new capabilities (Oxley & Sampson, 2004; Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008), 
access to new markets (Chen & Chen, 2002; Koka & Prescott, 2008), access to new 
assets (Huggins, 2010; Li, Eden, Hitt, & Ireland, 2008) including new knowledge 
(Walter, Lechner, & Kellermanns, 2007), and enhanced reputation (Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, 
Arregle, & Borza, 2000). Additionally, studies have found that  alliances can lead to more 
efficient facilitation of information transmittal between firms (Davis & Greve, 1997; 
Haunschild, 1993), or reduction in various forms of uncertainty (Beckman, Haunschild, 
& Phillips, 2004; Goerzen, 2007; Hamel, Doz, & Prahalad, 1989; Varadarajan & 
Cunningham, 1995). It is this last reason for, or benefit of, alliance formations, the 
potential for a reduction in uncertainty, that is the focus of this study.  
Certain types of uncertainty create an environmental condition that has the potential 
to wreak havoc on the firm, which is why firms desire to proactively address and 
subsequently attempt to reduce uncertainty whenever possible. Uncertainty can loosely 
be described as being in a state of doubt, depending on chance, and being unsure of the 
future.  What makes the concept of uncertainty difficult to address strategically is the fact 
that there are different types of uncertainty (e.g. market or systemic uncertainty, firm 
specific or unsystematic uncertainty) and that uncertainty can be experienced or 
perceived on several different levels (e.g., internal vs. external to the organization). 
Because of its complexity, uncertainty can negatively impact organizations’ planning and 
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decision making processes (Jauch & Kraft, 1986; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), leading to a 
firm’s attempt to avoid or reduce uncertainty.  Forming an alliance is one way to 
proactively address uncertainty, rooted in the understanding that some levels of 
uncertainty can be managed by adapting the organizational design that best fits the 
environment (Williamson, 1981). 
Alliances enable firms to deal with uncertainty better than a single firm because of the 
many synergistic effects alliances offer (Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 1991). 
However, given the various types of uncertainty, I suggest that simply forming an 
alliance is not adequate to address uncertainty. Special attention should also be devoted to 
selecting a partner with the right skills. Previous studies have found that the degree to 
which alliance partners’ specific skills and resources are similar or complementary 
matters (Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 2001), and that firms search for alliance 
partners with this dimension in mind (Doh, 2000; Stuart, 2000). Similarity can reduce 
friction and can lead to efficiencies. On the other hand, a degree of complementarity (or 
diversity) may be necessary to meet unforeseen challenges imposed by uncertainty. 
Whether similar or complementary partners lead to a reduction of uncertainty is an 
interesting question, one that I will investigate further in this study. I examine how 
similarity or complementarity between partners interacts with current environmental 
conditions, how subsequently investors interpret the partner skill combinations and how 
this interpretation will affect uncertainty as perceived by investors.    
In this study, I specifically examine how uncertainty as perceived by investors is 
affected by measuring components forming the explore/exploit dichotomy. Explorative 
and exploitative skills and expertise send very rich signals to investors, meaning that 
48 
 
 
these signals carry a lot of information which investors decode and react to. Exploration 
and exploitation are dimensions that, due to their ability to affect the trajectory of a firm, 
provide an effective base on which to assess investor reactions. I examine partner firms in 
order to observe partner combinations that can be considered as either similar or 
complementary. Firms are said to need distinctly different organization forms to 
successfully explore or exploit, making this dimension an ideal variable to distinguish 
between two partner firms.  
Further defining my research setting, I am focusing on two-firm alliances in the 
pharmaceutical industry between a biotech firm and a pharmaceutical company. I will 
specifically focus on how exogenous uncertainty moderates the relationship between the 
alliance partners and endogenous uncertainty experienced by the biotech firm. My 
research question is as follows: Given different levels of exogenous (industry) 
uncertainty (high, low), should partner-specific skills within an alliance be similar or 
complementary so as to send the desired signal to investors and, as a result, reduce the 
uncertainty of the biotech firm as perceived by investors?  
 I will draw on signaling theory (Spence, 1973; Spence, 1974) to derive six total (four 
specific) hypotheses and suggest that strong signals that communicate the alliance’s 
abilities to deal with different environmental conditions (e.g. different levels of 
exogenous uncertainty), based on the very specific combination of skills of the alliance 
partners, will lead to a positive (and desirable) reduction in firm-specific uncertainty as 
perceived by investors. I am extending the literature by focusing on the partner-skill 
combination of alliances in different environments defined by the level of exogenous 
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uncertainty. Empirical analysis using a sample of pharmaceutical alliances will test my 
hypotheses. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
The construct of uncertainty has been the subject of strong interest in prior 
management science studies, especially as it impacts strategic directions of the firm 
(Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009; Bourgeois III, 1985; Desarbo, Di Benedetto, Song, & 
Sinha, 2005; Jauch & Kraft, 1986; Mascarenhas, 2011) . The general consensus is that, 
while some uncertainty is unavoidable (systemic), a reduction in unsystematic (firm-
specific) uncertainty is possible and desirable but requires very specific, strategic action 
(Galbraith, 1973).  Because of the negative impact internal and external uncertainty may 
have on firms, managers are encouraged to actively try to reduce uncertainty whenever 
and wherever possible (Daft & Lengel, 1986). One available strategic response to 
uncertainty is to make changes to structural arrangements as they pertain to 
organizational design (Williamson, 1981), one of which is to enter a strategic alliance 
(Goerzen, 2007).  
Part of the process of forming an alliance is partner selection. I will explain later how 
I define effective alliance partner selection within the context of my research question, 
but would like to point out that the focus of this study is not on the process of selecting 
alliance partners. Instead I focus on how the combination of partners selected sends a 
signal to investors. The type of partner selected (in terms of explorative/exploitative 
skills) matters to the alliance, and as a result, matters to investors. Effective partners for 
the purpose of this study are those that create a partner-skill combination that lowers 
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firm-specific uncertainty as perceived by investors, given the level of exogenous 
uncertainty experienced by the alliance.  
The next section will outline the two different types of uncertainty I consider in this 
study: firm specific uncertainty, which will directly influence uncertainty as perceived by 
investors (the outcome variable), and exogenous uncertainty experienced by the industry 
(the moderator).   
Firm-Specific Uncertainty 
As Beckman et al. (2004) pointed out, firm-specific uncertainties arise when firms 
experience some internal turbulence, such as entering a new market (Greve, 1996), 
purchasing another firm (Haunschild, 1994), experiencing high internal turnover (Carroll, 
1984), experiencing information asymmetry between managers and shareholders, or 
doubting technical success (McGrath, 1997).  I proxy firm-specific uncertainty by 
measuring the focal firm’s stock price volatility, thereby conceptually following Lang 
and Lockhard (1990), who suggested that a firm’s internal perception of uncertainty is 
positively related to financial volatility.  
Examples of specific action to reduce firm-specific uncertainty can be found in the 
pharmaceutical industry. Firms may experience uncertainty when, for example, they 
know that a competitor is working toward a similar therapy (e.g. a cure for an illness). 
Increased investment by entering an alliance, which will provide access to new resources 
with the goal of eventually filing for patent protection before the competitor can do it, 
may be considered a strategic action taken to reduce firm-specific uncertainty. Therefore, 
firms in the pharmaceutical industries may deal with firm-specific uncertainty by entering 
into alliances, which is in line with McGrath’s (1997) assessment of firm responses to 
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internal uncertainty as well as with Pindyck’s (1993) suggestion that ‘taking action’ 
(entering an alliance, subsequently being able to focus on needed R&D, and filing for 
patent protection) can reduce internal uncertainty and lead to a higher probability of 
success.   
In addition, firm-specific uncertainty in the pharmaceutical industry arises largely out 
of the complex and resource-consuming approval process set up and monitored by the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Getting a new therapy approved may take upward 
of 15 years and costs, on average, over $800 million (Pennings & Sereno, 2011). The 
process itself consist of six distinct approval stages, starting at the pre-clinical stage, 
Investigative New Drug (IND) application, three phases including testing on humans, and 
eventually the approval and market stage. Before a therapy moves from one stage to the 
next, it has to prove its effectiveness (as defined by each stage). These FDA hurdles are 
designed to prove effectiveness, and because success is not certain, they create 
uncertainty, which I suggest will be observed through the stock price volatility of the 
partner firms.  
Because of the plethora of distinct skills and expertise, as well as other resources 
needed to move from one FDA approval stage to the next, a preferred organizational 
form to address the uncertainty that accompanies engagement in the approval process is 
the alliance. Entering into an alliance enables the partner firms to gain access to 
additional resources, which may reduce firm-specific uncertainty. The alliance 
announcement, therefore, might serve as a signal to the investors that firms are actively 
addressing internal uncertainty.  
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Next, I evaluate how the choice of combined skills and expertise of the partners 
affects investors’ perception of uncertainty, followed by a test of how exogenous 
uncertainty moderates this relationship.   
Skill combination of partners 
 It is understood that the search for an alliance partner has to go beyond simply 
choosing from the partner with the most resources, but rather involved choose a partner 
whose resources effectively complement or supplement those of the focal firm. Gaining 
access to the right resources, given the specific internal and external alliance 
environment, is a crucial managerial task (Shah & Swaminathan, 2008). The choice of 
partners, I assume, is a conscious strategic decision by the firm. This means that, 
assuming that each firm has options, the partner chosen may represent the partner that has 
the skills managers believe most efficiently offset any weaknesses of the other partner.  
  In this study, I frame the choice of partners along an exploration/exploitation 
dimension with regard to technical expertise.  Exploration is defined as searching, risk 
taking, discovery, innovation, and experimentation (March, 1991). Exploration has also 
been associated with concepts like investment, building new capabilities, and entering 
new lines of business (Koza & Lewin, 1999), and some would define it simply as the 
pursuit of new knowledge (Rothaermel, 2001). Because pursuit of the unknown by 
definition creates uncertainty about which exact skills are needed to succeed, firms may 
decide on a strategy focused around economies of scope.  
 Exploitation, on the other hand, more commonly refers to refinement, efficiency, 
production, selection, and implementation (March, 1991). Here firms are said to focus 
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more on economies of scale, using existing processes and knowledge to refine a product 
or process, but certainly do not consistently explore the unknown.  
 The decision to characterize partner skills based on exploration and exploitation is 
based on the literature’s acknowledgement that every individual firm, as well as the 
alliance in an aggregate, focuses to a degree on either or both of these activities (March, 
1991). Therefore, exploration and exploitation play a part in a firm’s overall strategic 
direction, and evidence of either should be found in any firm. Next, I will address these 
definitions as well as a justification for why I chose to express partner skills in those 
terms.   
  A basic premise of this study is that explorative skills will equip an organization to 
deal with environmental conditions that call for explorative responses, while exploitative 
skills prepare organizations to deal with exploitative environmental conditions. Because 
explorative and exploitative skills signal fundamentally different partner abilities, and 
because investors might be under-informed about with what the firms and the alliance 
will actually do, investors will rely on very basic properties of these signals. 
 The dimensions of exploration and exploitation are well suited for this study because 
they signal fundamentally different strategic directions and possible future trajectories of 
the firm. This study centers on the question of what partner-skill similarity or 
complementary signals to investors, and how this signal affects uncertainty as perceived 
by investors. I will explore the concepts of skill similarity and skill complementarity in 
the next section.  
 Effective partner selection, i.e., creating a partner combination that reduces 
uncertainty as perceived by investors, is a critical step in leading an alliance onto a path 
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toward perceived value creation. Previous studies have addressed the issue of partner 
skills and resource complementarity (Harrison et al., 2001; Ohmae, 1989).  The concept 
of complementary skills specifically refers to different skills that the partners bring into 
the alliance, with the assumption that different skills, such as abilities, knowledge, 
organizational design, and experience, etc., are then used strategically to offset possible 
weaknesses of the other partner. Skill similarity suggests that partners have similar types 
of skills (e.g., both have experience in the same type of therapeutic classes, both have 
guided a therapy through the FDA approval process, both have the ability to innovate). 
 Harrison et al. (2001) studied the question of resource similarity vs. complementarity 
and thus started this important conversation. Previous studies addressing skill similarity 
vs. complementarity have centered on the relatedness/performance hypothesis. Earlier 
research mostly suggested that relatedness should lead to higher performance (Singh & 
Montgomery, 1987). However, other studies found contradictory evidence and thus 
opened the door for additional research [see Harrison et al. (1991) for a review]. In the 
context of this study, higher performance should be achieved by creating lower internal 
uncertainty as perceived by investors. As a result I test the findings of previous studies by 
re-phrasing those terms of lower firm-specific uncertainty.  
  
Hypothesis 1: High levels of skill complementary between alliance partners results in 
low firm-specific uncertainty of the biotech firm as perceived by investors.  
 
Hypothesis 2: High levels of skill similarity between alliance partners results in low 
firm-specific uncertainty of the biotech firm as perceived by investors. 
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Exogenous Uncertainty 
 While firm-specific uncertainty is specific to the firm, exogenous uncertainty is the 
kind that every firm within an industry or group experiences. Because it is, to a degree, 
systemic to the industry or group, this type of uncertainty cannot be controlled at the firm 
level. Exogenous uncertainty is an independent construct from firm-specific uncertainty 
because it is possible for a firm to experience very low internal uncertainty while the 
industry to which the firm belongs may experience high uncertainty, or vice versa. For 
example, an industry might experience overall demand uncertainty, but the individual 
firm-specific demand might be stable. As a result, I will designate the industry 
environment as one of high exogenous uncertainty or low exogenous uncertainty at the 
time of the alliance announcement and measure how exogenous uncertainty moderates 
the relationship between the choice of alliance partners and firm-specific uncertainty of 
the biotech firm as perceived by investors. The next two hypotheses in this study are 
designed to test investors’ perception of uncertainty under high exogenous uncertainty.  
 I suggest that high exogenous uncertainty calls for strategic approaches that broaden 
the resource level within the alliance. Because high exogenous uncertainty present at the 
industry level suggests that an alliance has to address a greater diversity of issues than an 
alliance operating under low exogenous uncertainty, resource complementarity could lead 
to the desired economies of scope (Harrison et al., 2001). By selecting a partner with 
complementary skills, the alliance partner firms would create some flexibility and put 
themselves in a position to be able to address a more diverse range of issues. This could 
lead to a subsequent reduction in uncertainty of the biotech partner as perceived by 
investors.  
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 Choosing a partner with similar skills, however, equates to introducing more of the 
same resources and skills into the alliance. This would not be as desirable a strategy in an 
environment of high exogenous uncertainty because the alliance runs the risk of having 
excess unusable resources, while not possessing other, requites resources. The alliance is 
unable to use its existing resources to address and cope with exogenous uncertainty; more 
of the same would not be viewed as beneficial by investors. As a result I suggest two 
hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The level of exogenous uncertainty moderates the relationship between 
skill sets of alliances partners and firm-specific uncertainty of the biotech firm as 
perceived by investors such that under high levels of exogenous uncertainty, skill 
complementarity of the alliance partners results in low firm-specific uncertainty of 
the biotech firm as perceived by investors.  
 
Hypothesis 4: The level of exogenous uncertainty moderates the relationship between 
skill sets of alliances partners and firm-specific uncertainty of the biotech firm as 
perceived by investors such that under high levels of exogenous uncertainty, skill 
similarity of the alliance partners results in low firm-specific uncertainty of the 
biotech firm as perceived by investors.  
 
 Hypotheses 4 and 5 will test the investors’ perception of uncertainty (of the biotech 
firm) under low exogenous uncertainty. Low exogenous uncertainty suggests that the 
industry in which the alliance operates in does not experience a lot of turbulences but 
operates in a rather stable environment. This would suggest that firms have figured out 
what kinds of resources are needed to survive.  
 I suggest that under low levels of exogenous uncertainty, investors will react 
positively to alliances that appear to be aware of the general lack of this type of 
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uncertainty and thus focus on efficiencies as well as economies of scale. Given the nature 
of a stable industry environment with low uncertainty, firms have the luxury to carefully 
select a partner that will enhance their own capabilities by adding to those (e.g. more of 
the same). In the absence of high exogenous uncertainty, alliances can now afford to 
focus all of their efforts (meaning: all of the combined skills and expertises) on one goal: 
to either explore or to exploit. Therefore, alliances signal to investors that they are aware 
of the lack of exogenous uncertainty and that they are willing and ready to capitalize on 
this knowledge.  Because of the lack of exogenous uncertainty companies do not have to 
take efficiency risks.  
 If, in this state of low exogenous uncertainty, alliances would comprise of firms with 
complementary skills, investors may critically question that partner combination because 
it may not lead to the desired maximum performance. The partner selection could signal 
that the partners are either not aware of the lack of exogenous uncertainty, or that no 
other partner was available or willing to enter into a partnership. Neither signal would be 
well received by investors because they signal some lack of external awareness. Low 
exogenous uncertainty would call for strategies that aim to capitalize on the opportunities 
for economies of scale. Investors observe this, and as a result I suggest that: 
 
Hypothesis 5: The level of exogenous uncertainty moderates the relationship between 
skill sets of alliances partners and firm-specific uncertainty of the biotech firm as 
perceived by investors such that under low levels of exogenous uncertainty, skill 
complementarity of the alliance partners result in low firm-specific uncertainty of the 
biotech firm as perceived by investors.  
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Hypothesis 6: The level of exogenous uncertainty moderates the relationship between 
skill sets of alliances partners and firm-specific uncertainty of the biotech firm as 
perceived by investors such that under low levels of exogenous uncertainty, skill 
similarity of the alliance partners result in low firm-specific uncertainty of the biotech 
firm as perceived by investors.  
 
 
METHODS 
Sample 
I used a sample of bilateral alliances that include biotech firms and pharmaceutical 
companies. I coded firms as Client or R&D to indicate the relationship where, generally, 
the pharmaceutical company represents the Client firm and the biotech firm represents 
the R&D partner. I chose this industry because alliances are a very common 
organizational from, where partners are likely to work with each other numerous times. 
In addition, this industry relies heavily on patent protection for its products which, as I 
outlined before, sends very rich signals about the technical expertise of the alliance 
partners.  
All patent information was obtained from the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER) Patent Citations database (Hall, Jaffe, Trajtenberg, & Centre for Economic 
Policy Research (Great Britain), 2001), and the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office’s (USPTO) Cassis database. Additional data were taken from Compustat data 
files, the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) U.S. stock database, the 
Recombinant Capital Biotechnology Database (ReCap), the IMS R&D Focus database, 
Spectrum Institutional Ownership files, and United States Securities and Exchange (SEC) 
proxy (DEF 14a) filings.  
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The initial sample included 28,470 biopharmaceutical alliances established between 
January 1st, 1989 and December 31st, 2008. I used the Wharton Research Data Services 
(WRDS), and specifically the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database, to 
determine which alliances included both biotech firms and pharmaceutical firms that 
were publicly traded at the end of the month of the event date. Next, I further refined the 
event date (date of the alliance announcement) by performing a web search on each 
partner combination in the stated month; this search produced specific alliance 
announcements which allowed me to define the exact date of the announcement. This 
final data set includes 927 alliance events with exactly two partners that were both 
publicly traded as of the event date.  
Measures 
Dependent Variable 
Firm-Specific Uncertainty: I used the volatility of the focal R&D firm’s stock price as 
a proxy for firm-specific uncertainty (Beckman et al., 2004). The management literature 
cites a high correlation between the managerial perception of (firm-specific) uncertainty 
and the volatility of the firm’s stock prices (Bourgeois III, 1985; Lang & Lockhart, 
1990), which justifies the use of stock prices to proxy firm-specific uncertainty.  
Specifically, following Beckman et al. (2004) I operationalize an individual firm’s 
level of internal uncertainty as the coefficient of variation for firm j’s annual stock 
closing price, or 
 
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚′𝑠𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒,𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑖,𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑗)
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 (𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚′𝑠 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒,𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑖,𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑗)  
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where i = 1988, …, 2007, and the index j represents each firm in the sample.  
 By dividing the standard deviation by the mean, effectively calculating the coefficient 
of variation, measurements of uncertainty can be interpreted across firms with different 
price ranges (Beckman et al., 2004). I then matched this measure of R&D firm specific 
uncertainty to each alliance based on firm ID and alliance date, where I used the firm-
specific uncertainty from the year prior to the alliance announcement.  
Independent Variables 
 Partner Similarity (Technical Expertise): I measure technical similarity using patent 
citation counts of each partner. While prior studies have used R&D intensity as a measure 
of technological capabilities (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989; Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 
1996), Mowery et al. (1998) pointed out that R&D intensity is an input measure while 
patents are an output measure that more accurately reflects technology-based capabilities.  
 I conceptually follow previous studies (Mowery et al., 1998; Rothaermel & Boeker, 
2008; Vassolo, Anand, & Folta, 2004)  that measured the degree of 
similarity/complementarity, between two firms by calculating dyadic patent or patent 
citation ratios for each partner combination and measuring the distance between the ratios 
as indicators of the degree of difference between partners. Specifically, I calculate the 
technological distance between alliance partners by taking the absolute distance between 
patent citation ratios of each firm (Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008), or  
 
61 
 
 
|( 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 (𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡)
𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡  (𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡+𝑅&𝐷)) - ( 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 (𝑅&𝐷)Patent Citation Count (Client+R&D))| 
 
 Each ratio represents the percentage of total technical expertise brought into the 
alliance by each partner. The absolute difference between the two ratios represents the 
difference in technical expertise brought into the alliance by each partner and thus 
represents a measure of technological similarity/complementarity within this dyadic 
relationship. A smaller distance would suggest that each partner contributed a more equal 
portion to the total technical expertise of the alliance (which suggests a higher degree of 
technical similarity of the alliance partners), whereas a greater distance suggests that the 
partners contributed a more unequal portion of the total technical expertise of the alliance 
(which suggests a higher degree of technical complementarity of the alliance partners).  
 I then transformed the difference value by taking (1 – value). As a result, an increase 
in this variable represents a move toward less distance between the partners, which may 
be interpreted as an exploitative partner combination. A decrease in this variable 
represents a trend toward greater distance between these variables, which would suggest 
an explorative relationship. I decided on this transformation to ensure a level of 
conformity to my related studies in which an increase in this value suggests a move 
towards exploitation, and a decrease suggests a move toward exploration.   
Exogenous (Industry-Specific) Uncertainty: Following Levitas & Chi (2010) and 
Beckman et al. (2004) I operationalize industry uncertainty by calculating the annual 
coefficient of variation for the industry’s monthly stock prices, thus proxying managerial 
uncertainty within an industry by creating a measure of industry volatility (Lang & 
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Lockhart, 1990). The fundamental approach and rationale to creating this variable is 
similar to the dependent variable in this study. I then matched the annual measure to the 
alliance data by using the coefficient of variation from the year prior to the alliance 
announcement. 
Control Variables 
 Firm size: I control for firm size because prior research suggests that firm size may 
explain R&D expenditures and firm performance (Levitas & McFadyen, 2009). R&D 
expenditures are especially relevant in this study because of their potential correlation 
with exploration and exploitation. I used the natural log of the Client firm’s total assets as 
of December 31st of the year prior to the alliance date, which captures both tangible and 
intangible assets. Firms in the biopharmaceutical industry firms often do not carry 
significant tangible assets but rather intangible assets (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006), and 
patents are a form of intangible assets.  
 Industry environment: I created an industry index based on the Lerner Index (Lerner, 
1994) as an indicator of the industry's willingness and ability to fund R&D projects in the 
biotech industry (Levitas & McFadyen, 2009). Willingness and ability to fund R&D 
projects greatly depend on the macroeconomic environment and industry outlook. There 
is less funding available during economic downturns as companies and investors retract 
from engaging in risky endeavors, such as R&D.  This retraction would then be captured 
in this index; hence this measure is an appropriate proxy for the macroeconomic 
environment for the purpose of this study.  
 I calculated the index by using the month-end share price of common stock of a 
random sample of 12 biopharmaceutical companies from January 31st,1989 to December 
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31st, and set January 1st, 1989 to 1.000, resulting in a total of 240 industry values (or one 
index per month). I then matched those to the alliance date by using the industry index 
from the month ending prior to the alliance date.  
 Firm Age: To control for Client firm age is appropriate because the older the firm, 
the higher the probability that it had engaged in the patenting. Therefore age may 
influences the variable partner similarity. Firm age is measured in years since the firm’s 
founding at the time of the alliance announcement (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006).  
 R&D Expenditures: This variable is used as an indicator of the firm's R&D 
commitment and intensity, which are likely to have an impact on knowledge creation and 
subsequently on patenting activity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Leiponen & Helfat, 2010). 
I used the Clients’ R&D expense at the end of the year prior to the alliance 
announcement. 
 Tobin’s Q: Tobin’s Q is a measure of intangible resources (Kumar, 2011) and as such 
an important factor to control for in a study that uses intangible assets (patents). It is 
calculated by dividing the market value of the Client firm (share price at the end of the 
year times the number of share outstanding) by the total year-end book value of the focal 
firm. I then matched Tobin’s Q to each firm for the year ending prior to the alliance 
announcement.  
Model and Estimation 
 I tested the hypotheses using a linear mixed model analysis that examines the effect 
of partner similarity and industry uncertainty on firm specific uncertainty of the R&D 
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partner in a two-firm alliance.  In addition to the two independent variables I included 
described above in the regression analysis.  
 In the sample of 927 alliances, 382 firms account for the (2 x 927 =) 1,854 partners 
involved in the alliances. Further, 155 firms appear only once in the sample while one 
firm appears 53 times. Because of this unbalanced nature of the sample, as well as the 
likely presence of between-subject (firm) specific effects, a standard estimation method 
would not be appropriate.  
 To adjust for the characteristics of the sample, I used a linear mixed model design to 
execute the regression analysis that allows the subjects (firms) to differ from one another 
(Maxwell & Delaney, 2004). This approach allowed me to introduce random effects for 
each of the partner firms. Parameters were estimated by the method of maximum 
likelihood using the Proc Mixed procedure in SAS 9.3. 
RESULTS 
 Definitions of variables and the full model specifications are shown in Table 1. 
Descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix used in this study are provided in Table 2. 
The results of the linear mixed regression analysis are reported in Table 3, where Model 1 
serves as the base model, including only the control variables, Model 2 includes the 
independent variables, and Model 3 serves as the full model including the interaction 
term.   
 A close examination showed that the dependent variable Firm Uncertainty, as well as 
its residuals, is not normally distributed. As a result, I transformed the variable using a 
square root transformation. I confirmed the successful transformation by visually 
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inspecting the Q-Q plot as well as the P-P plot and deemed the dependent variable as well 
as the residuals to be approximately normal.  
 To assess the threat of collinearity, I estimated the variance inflation factors (VIF) 
and found none to be great than 1.227. Several prior studies cite different cutoff values, 
and I went with a conservative cutoff value of 10 (Lee, 2011). As a result I conclude that 
no linear dependency between the independent variables exists.  
 A likelihood ratio test, comparing Model 1 to Model 2, produced a chi-square statistic 
(χ2 = 2.6, 2 d.f.) below the critical value of 5.991. This suggests that the addition of 
Partner Similarity in Model 2 did not significantly improve the model fit from model 1. 
Due to this lack of overall explanatory power, and the fact that the regression coefficient 
for Partner Similarity in Model 2 is not statistically significant, I reject hypotheses 1 and 
2, which suggested that the alliance partner combination in terms of similarity or 
complementarity has an impact on firm specific uncertainty as perceived by investors.  
 The likelihood ratio test comparing Model 1 to Model 3 (which I used to test 
hypotheses 3 – 6) produced a chi-square statistic (χ2 = 8.6, 3 d.f.) above the critical value 
of 7.815, suggesting that the addition of the three variables in Model 3 did significantly 
improve the explanatory power of the model.  
 Hypotheses 3, 4, 5 and 6 test the effect of partner similarity on firm specific 
uncertainty as perceived by investors under differing levels of exogenous uncertainty. 
Model 3 in Table 3 shows the regression results pertaining to these hypotheses, indicating 
significant findings. Figure 2 displays the relationship between partner similarity and firm 
specific uncertainty as perceived by investors under different levels of exogenous 
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uncertainty. Note that low partner similarity in the chart suggests partner 
complementarity. 
 Specifically, hypothesis 3 suggested that in an environment of high exogenous 
uncertainty investors favor partner complementarity over an alliance partner combination 
where the partners display similarity. This relationship is confirmed in Figure 2, which 
shows that under high levels of exogenous uncertainty investors prefer partner 
complementarity over partner similarity, as evidenced by lower firm specific uncertainty. 
Based on the statistically significant findings of Model 3 in Table 3, as well as the 
interpretation of the interaction effect in Figure 2, I accept hypothesis 3 and consequently 
reject hypothesis 4.  
 Hypotheses 5 and 6 focus on the relationship between partner similarity and firm 
specific uncertainty as perceived by investors under low levels of exogenous uncertainty. 
Specifically, hypothesis 5 suggested that under these low levels of exogenous 
uncertainty, investors favor partner complementarity over partner similarity. Model 3 in 
Table 3 again shows the statistically significant findings. Figure 2 shows that under low 
levels of exogenous uncertainty investors prefer similar partners over partners with 
complementary skills. As a result, I reject hypothesis 5 but conclude that I found 
statistically significant evidence to accept hypothesis 6, which suggests that under low 
levels of exogenous uncertainty, investors prefer partners with similar skills.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this study was to first investigate if the degree of similarity between 
alliance partners affects investors’ perception of uncertainty, as indicated by stock price 
volatility. Second, if and how exogenous uncertainty moderates this relationship. I 
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focused on dyadic R&D alliances and used their technical expertise as an indicator of 
similarity/complementarity.  Technical expertise has previously been used in the 
management literature as an indicator of partner similarity (see, for example, Ahuja et al. 
(2009) or Mari et al. (2010).  
I used a linear mixed regression analysis to test the three sets of hypotheses. I found 
no support for the first set of hypotheses, which suggested that the degree of partner 
similarity should influence investors’ perception of uncertainty. Considering the general 
business environment, the findings might actually make great sense in that no firm works 
in a vacuum. The external environment should always play a role in a firm’s strategic 
decision making process (Larrañeta, Zahra, & González, 2013). As such, investors may 
not pay special attention to partner attributes, but rather consider those in context of the 
external environment. Hypotheses 3 to 6 specifically consider the external environment.  
The results of the second set of hypotheses focused on the interaction between partner 
similarity and the level of exogenous uncertainty. I found support for the idea that, when 
faced with high levels of exogenous uncertainty, investors prefer alliances with partners 
that are less similar, or more complementary, to each other.  The findings support the idea 
that under high levels of uncertainty, investors prefer alliances that offer greater 
flexibility to quickly adapt to a changing environment, which partners with different 
skills may be better equipped to achieve than partners with more similar skills. As such, 
the findings are in line with previous studies, for example Harrison et al. (2001) which 
suggested that resource complementarity, a form of resource broadening,  is desirable 
under high levels of exogenous uncertainty.  
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The findings of this second set of hypotheses might suggest that investors pay close 
attention to this dimension of partner choice when a new alliance is announced. Because 
a diverse set of partners might be better equipped (meaning they may possess different 
skills) to quickly address a volatile external environment, one that demands different 
strategic responses to different environmental conditions, investors appear to send a 
positive signal to the market and the alliance. Specifically, as suggested by Shah and 
Swaminathan (2008), investors may reward the alliance for choosing the right resources 
given the external environment, which may signal managerial competence.  
The third set of hypotheses investigated investors’ perception of uncertainty under 
low levels of exogenous uncertainty. I found statistical support that in a less uncertain 
environment, investors prefer alliance partners that are more similar to each other 
(hypothesis 6). This might also point to managerial competence because managers have 
shown the ability to choose their alliance partners based on skills that match the needs of 
the firms in this environment. Specifically, the relative certainty of the external 
environment might present the firm with an opportunity to focus on economies of scale, 
which in turn might lead to higher efficiencies.   
I realize, of course, that this study is not without limitations. First, I used a very 
specific dimension of the firm as indicator of partner similarity. Follow up studies might 
consider other dimensions on which to compare the partners and measure their relative 
distance to each other in an effort to create a more comprehensive indicator of similarity. 
Second, while stock market volatility is a common measure of firm and industry 
uncertainty, other measures using surveys exist as well. Future studies may want to 
consider using a survey method to gauge firm- and industry-specific uncertainty.  
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In summary, coding partner similarity and complementarity along a dimension of 
technical expertise and in terms of exploration and exploitation is a novel approach that 
has not been explored in the management literature. This paper and its findings represent 
a valuable contribution to the field of strategic management, and advance our 
understanding of investor reaction to alliance announcements.  
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Table 1: Definition of variables and model specifications 
Variable Name Definition 
  
Firm Specific 
Uncertainty (R&D) 
The standardized monthly volatility of the R&D firm’s stock price in the 
year prior to the alliance announcement. It is calculated as the natural log 
of the coefficient of variation for each R&D firm in the sample.  
Exogenous 
Uncertainty 
The standardized monthly volatility of the stock price of a portfolio of 13 
biopharmaceutical firms in the year prior to the alliance announcement. 
It is calculated as the natural log of the coefficient of variation for the 
portfolio of firms.  
Partner Similarity An indicator of the uniqueness of the technical expertise of the two 
partner firms in the focal alliance based on patent citation overlap. A low 
value indicates exploration, a high value indicates exploitation.  
Size (Client) Control variable, the natural log of total assets of the Client firm 
Industry Environment Control variable, an industry index proxying the funding availability in 
the focal industry.  
Age (Client) Control variable, the age of the client firm from the firm’s founding to 
the alliance date. 
R&D Expenditures 
(Client) 
Control variable,  
Tobin’s Q (Client) Control variable 
 
  
Table 2: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
               Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Firm Specific Uncertainty (R&D) .58 .12 1 
        2 Partner Similarity .00 .49 .004 1 
       3 Exogenous Uncertainty .00 .03 -.014 .017 1 
      4 Partner Similarity x Industry Uncertainty .00 .02 .023 .009 .015 1 
     5 Size (Client) 7.73 2.54 -.029 .034 -.015 -.058 1 
    6 Industry Environment 1.46 .31 .259** .038 .275** .043 .021 1 
   7 Age (Client) 88.04 226.44 .011 .009 -.050 -.006 -.057 -.065* 1 
  8 R&D Expenditures (Client) 1233.94 1980.30 -.066 .034 -.094* -.069 -.034 -.182** .075 1 
 9 Tobin's Q (Client) 180.98 734.08 .112 .091 .079 .064 -.026 .127* -.009 -.063 1 
 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Statistics estimated using centered values of variables involved in interaction 
         
77 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Maximum Likelihood Estimates on Firm Specific Uncertainty of Technical Expertise Similarity      
       
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Firm Uncertainty (R&D) Firm Uncertainty (R&D) Firm Uncertainty (R&D) 
       Intercept 0.501 (0.053) 0.486 (0.053) 0.470 (0.053)*** 
Partner Similarity 
  
-0.013 (0.018) -0.007 (0.018) 
Exogenous Uncertainty 
  
-0.398 (0.280) -0.358 (0.276) 
Partner Similarity x Industry Uncertainty 
    
1.350 (0.543)* 
Size (Client) -0.000 (0.003) -0.000 (0.003) 0.000 (0.003) 
Industry Environment 0.054 (0.029)† 0.065 (0.030)† 0.074 (0.030)† 
Age (Client) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
R&D Expenditures (Client) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Tobin's Q (Client) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
       Log-likelihood ratio -261.4 
 
-264 
 
-270 
 Log-likelihood ratio vs. Model 1 
  
2.6 
 
8.6 * 
N 183   183   183   
       Standard errors appear in parentheses 
  †p<0.10; *p>0.05; **p>0.01; ***p>0.001 
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Figure 1: Relationship between partner similarity and firm specific uncertainty under low 
and high levels of exogenous uncertainty (hypotheses 3 to 6).  
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SPILLOVER EFFECTS IN ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIPS 
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INTRODUCTION 
We know that when firms enter alliances they do so in an attempt to unlock possible 
synergistically driven advantages, such as access to new markets (Chen & Chen, 2002; 
Koka & Prescott, 2008), access to new assets (Huggins, 2010; Li, Eden, Hitt, & Ireland, 
2008), or to pursue an increase in legitimacy (Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Arregle, & Borza, 
2000), just to name a few. The skills and expertise of the partners are factors that 
determine the extent to which the alliance will be able to succeed. Alliances are formed at 
least partially because the partner firms are attracted to each other because of potentially 
synergistic effects achieved by combining their resources. However, inviting another 
entity into a formal cooperation connects the firms in such a way that both positive and 
negative actions by one partner may now spill over and affect the other partner.  
In this study, I will examine how an action by one of the alliance partners - to enter a 
new, additional alliance while still engaged in the original base alliance - affects the 
other, original partner. The literature suggests that firms seek multiple alliance partners 
for two main reasons: 1) to maximize their influence within a network, and 2) to reduce 
uncertainty by maximizing their access to strategic capabilities (Burgers, Hill, & Kim, 
1993). The question I ask here goes beyond the motivation for this behavior, but rather 
addresses how entering an additional alliance by one partner will affect the other, initial, 
alliance partner? I will focus on two-firm alliances in the biotech-pharmaceutical arena in 
which multiple simultaneous alliances are not uncommon, and examine how an 
additional alliance by one original partner impacts the stock price of the other original 
partner. 
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Ample resources have been devoted to study the stock market reaction to a new 
alliance announcement on the partner firms (Oxley, Sampson, & Silverman, 2009). Most, 
though not all, of the literature suggests that these alliance announcements trigger a 
positive stock market reaction (Anand & Khanna, 2000; Dyer, Kale, & Singh, 2001; Shah 
& Swaminathan, 2008). In addition, the complex nature of the innovation process in this 
industry may suggest that simultaneous engagement in multiple alliances to access new 
knowledge is a vital part of the firm strategy (Hess & Rothaermel, 2011). The 
combination of the positive stock market reaction and the desire to gain access to new 
knowledge in order to stay competitive may entice firms to enter multiple alliances, 
possibly without much regard to how this will affect older, yet still active, alliance 
partners.  
My research question is as follows: Given that firm A and firm B are currently in an 
active alliance, how does the market react to the information that firm A has entered (or 
is entering) into a new alliance with firm C? Specifically, how does this information of a 
new alliance affect the market price of the initial partner (firm B)?  
For early clarification purposes, I am focusing on two alliances: the base alliance (or 
initial alliance) and the new alliance. I define the pharmaceutical company currently in 
the base alliance as PBase. This is the alliance partner that will enter into a new alliance. 
BBase represents the biotech firm currently in the base alliance. This is the partner whose 
share price I will monitor to detect changes due to PBase entering into a new alliance with 
BNew. BNew is the biotech firm that will enter into a new alliance with PBase.  
Because many factors may influence the market’s reaction to the new alliance 
announcement, it is not clear whether the market’s response to a new alliance 
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announcement will be positive or negative from the perspective of the initial alliance 
partner. To further study contributing factors, I will pay special attention to how the 
market considers one specific factor when valuing BBase. Specifically, I hypothesize that 
whether the new alliance will operate in the same therapeutic class as the base alliance 
will have an impact on the valuation of BBase. Using signaling theory (Spence, 1973; 
Spence, 1974) as theoretical foundation to derive my hypotheses, I suggest that the 
market could conceivably react positively or negatively, which results in two sets of 
competing hypotheses. 
I aim to contribute to the literature by furthering our understanding of how the market 
interprets signals sent by one party, transfers the decoded information, and applies the 
new knowledge to other entities. By entering a new alliance, the partner PBase may 
conceivably signal that the base alliance was not likely to generate the desired outcomes 
and, as a result, PBase decided to move on and shift resources to a new alliance (which 
may result in a negative market reaction to BBase). However, the same action of entering a 
new alliance could conceivably signal that the base alliance is in such an advanced stage 
and path toward success that it will thrive despite a now somewhat divided attention of 
resources by PBase (which might result in a positive market reaction to BBase). I am using a 
unique sample of biopharmaceutical alliances to test my hypotheses. 
The following section provides an overview of the literature and theory of alliance 
formation, leading to the hypotheses that I will test in this study. Subsequent sections will 
show the empirical analyses and findings. I will conclude with a discussion of the 
implications and limitations of this study. 
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 Alliances have received a strong focus in the management literature. This 
organizational form may be defined as a formal cooperative agreement between two or 
more organizations, involving the pooling or trading of resources, with or without equity. 
The current study focuses fundamentally on market reactions to a new alliance 
announcement. Assuming that the investors have the ability to identify and decode 
signals sent by the involved parties, investors react to the announcement of a new alliance 
based on their interpretation of how this strategic action will impact the future 
performance of the involved parties.  
 Alliances are generally thought of as a performance catalyst for the partner firms. By 
inviting an independent entity (partner firm) to share resources, alliance partners signal 
that they believe that they might be able to generate synergistically driven outcomes 
(Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 1991), which may ultimately lead to an increase in 
their market value. Several studies have focused on the direct, immediate stock market 
effect on the partner firms entering an alliance [see Burton (2005)]. 
 In this study, however, I am looking beyond the direct effect on the partner firms 
announcing the new alliance (PBase and BNew); I focus on how a new (additional) alliance 
announcement will affect an old, existing, initial partner (BBase). Since the base alliance 
partners are still in an active alliance, I would suggest that the initial partner (BBase), 
although not directly involved in creating the new alliance (between PBase and BNew), will 
be affected by its partner’s action to enter into a new alliance. How will investors react to 
the new alliance announcement, and thereby affect this initial partner?  
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 Owners (investors) generally lack some knowledge of firm operations in comparison 
to managers, which exposes the investors to information asymmetry. Signaling theory 
(Spence, 1973; Spence, 1974) has been used to addresses issues concerning information 
asymmetry between owners and managers. The theory suggests that in the absence of 
perfect information, reading signals can reduce said information asymmetry, which 
would in turn impact the valuation of the firm or alliance by the investors. I suggest that 
by entering into a new alliance with a specific partner that will contribute certain 
expertise and experiences (here, experience in the therapeutic class), PBase sends a signal 
to the market. The question is how the market will interpret these signals.  
 Because selecting the right partner is crucial to the success of an alliance, past studies 
have focused on issues surrounding the partner selection process (Beckman, Haunschild, 
& Phillips, 2004; Dollinger, Golden, & Saxton, 1997; Hitt et al., 2000; Kale & Singh, 
2009; Shah & Swaminathan, 2008). Especially partner characteristics that may benefit 
the alliance are an important consideration when choosing the right partner, one that will 
help create synergistic effects and, possibly, the desired increase in value. The range of 
areas within the firms that could benefit from the synergistic effects of the alliance 
formation can include all functional areas of the firm. For example, as mentioned above, 
alliances generally create an initial positive shock to the partners’ market value (Dyer et 
al., 2001; Shah & Swaminathan, 2008), thereby positively influencing the finance 
department of a firm. Other studies have found positive effects on operations (Anand & 
Khanna, 2000), marketing (Swaminathan & Moorman, 2009), or R&D (Rothaermel, 
2001). Because synergistic effects can be created in different types of alliances, I am not 
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limiting this study to only one type, but rather include all types of alliances (e.g., R&D, 
marketing).  
 Because of these possible benefits to various functional departments, we have seen an 
increasing trend toward alliance formation in certain industries such as automotive, 
banking, or telecommunication (Garcia-Pont, 2006). Firms recognize the potential to reap 
the benefits of an increased market valuation, as well as an increase in long-term 
performance measures. Wanting to reach the maximum potential performance, managers 
may be inclined to enter into and actively work on several alliances at the same time. 
This is a form of diversification; especially in the pharmaceutical industry, in which the 
costs for a new approved therapy are high, but the potential (financial benefits) are even 
higher, firms may choose to work on several therapies at the same time so as to create 
several possible income streams.  
 Clearly, however, not all alliances succeed, and the threat of failure impacts investor 
perceptions. Research suggests that a significant number of alliances, in fact, between 
30% and 70%, fail or are prematurely terminated (Bamford, Gomes-Casseres, & 
Robinson, 2003; Lunnan & Haugland, 2008), leading to a destruction of shareholder 
value of the alliance partners (Kale, Dyer, & Singh, 2002). This would suggest that 
investors ought to be cautious regarding how to react to a new announcement. While 
partner firms may enter the alliance with the desire to create synergistic effects, I note 
that entering into an alliance does not guarantee that the partners are able to take 
advantage of synergistic possibilities.   
 Some studies have noted that entering into additional alliances, while a form of 
diversification, may in fact impact the value of other, existing partnerships. For example, 
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Rothaermel & Deeds (2006) suggested an inverted U-shaped relationship between the 
number of R&D alliances in a firm’s portfolio and the innovative output of said alliances. 
The authors attribute this relationship to the fact that managerial and financial resources 
are finite, and the more alliances a firm manages, the more strained the resources, leading 
to information-processing overload (Hitt, Hoskisson, & Kim, 1997; Zahra, Ireland, & 
Hitt, 2000). In other words, too many alliances might lead to a reduction in productivity, 
which in turn might be recognized by the investors. As a result, the investors might 
change the value of some or all involved firms. 
I believe, however, that it would be an oversimplification to suggest simply that the 
latest (newest) alliances would always suffer the most from this decline in productivity. 
Partner firms might assign priority / importance to certain alliances regardless of the 
timing of their formation. Therefore, I note that the number of alliances is an important 
variable to consider, but to make a general statement concerning the resource allocation 
to the initial alliances, which might affect the productivity and, in turn, the valuation of 
the partner firms, might not be possible. For now, I note that entering into multiple 
alliances can have a positive or a negative spillover effect on existing alliance partners. I 
will now move on and introduce an additional dimension which I suggest is important to 
consider when predicting how investors will react to a new alliance announcement and 
subsequently change the valuation of BBase.  
The first set of hypotheses concentrates on a scenario in which the new alliance has a 
focus in the same therapeutic class as the base alliance. For example, if the base alliance 
with PBase and BBase is working on a cancer therapy, then I will analyze new alliances of 
PBase that are also working on a cancer-related therapy and study the effect of the new 
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alliances on BBase. Will the market be influenced by the fact that the old and new alliances 
operate in the same therapeutic class?  
Several organizational capabilities can act as signals to the market as to whether the 
alliance might be successful or not. Learning is one of those capabilities (Nelson & 
Winter, 1982). With learning comes experience, and having alliance experience 
(including, for example, managing partners, managing resources, writing alliance 
contracts, having spent resources in a specific therapeutic class, etc.) that could make the 
alliance more efficient, leading, ceteris paribus, to a higher probability of success. 
Therefore, having relevant experience in the specific focus of the alliance should send 
signals that would impact the market’s reaction to the new alliance announcement. In 
other words, experience might influence investors’ perception of value if it is used as a 
decodable signal.   
If the new alliance has a similar focus (defined as operating in the same therapeutic 
class) to that of the base alliance, then it could be suggested that the partners of the new 
alliance might benefit from the experience already developed by PBase. I would expect 
that fewer resources will have to be employed to learn and generate experiences, which 
should lead to higher efficiencies and a higher probability of success for the new alliance. 
This might be a positive development for the base alliance in that PBase could 
conceptually leave more resources in the base alliance, which would suggest that the base 
alliance might not be as negatively affected by the new alliance (and the potential 
corresponding resource drain). In fact, I suggest that this scenario might affect the base 
alliance positively in that the learning and experience from the new alliance might 
actually spill back to the base alliance, therefore benefiting said base alliance. I will 
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denote the new alliance partner of PBase working on a therapy in the same therapeutic 
class as the base alliance as BNewSTC. I suggest that it is possible that: 
 
Hypothesis 1A: The announcement of a new alliance between PBase and BNewSTC 
operating in the same therapeutic class as the base alliance will positively affect the 
share price of BBase. 
  
 However, if the new alliance operates in the same therapeutic class as the base 
alliance it might potentially signal to the market that the base alliance was either on a 
trajectory that PBase does not believe will lead to the desired results (hence the action to 
enter into a new alliance and to start shifting resources toward a potentially more 
successful venture; the benefit of being able to diversify), or simply that BNewSTC is a more 
desirable partner. It is beyond the scope of this study to analyze exactly why the market 
decodes this signal as negative, but I suggest that it is possible that the market decodes 
the action by PBase to enter a new alliance as a signal that the base alliance was not 
believed to have the potential to create the desired success or that some firms are trying to 
play their partners off against each other. Any of these reasons might negatively affect 
the market value of BBase, and in this case I would expect to see evidence that: 
 
Hypothesis 1B: The announcement of a new alliance between PBase and BNewSTC 
operating in the same therapeutic class as the base alliance will negatively affect the 
share price of BBase. 
 
The second set of hypotheses focuses on a scenario in which the new alliance has a 
focus that is in a different therapeutic class than the base alliance, whereas I will denote 
the new alliance partner of PBase as BNewDTC. The signal that the announcement of a new 
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alliance sends could again be interpreted either positively or negatively as it pertains to 
the base alliance, and subsequently to BBase, the focus of this study.  
The same basic arguments used in developing the first set of hypotheses apply. 
However, with the new alliance operating in a different therapeutic class than the base 
alliance, any advantage that the market may have considered to be present in the first set 
of hypotheses is now not present; the benefits of the new alliance operating in the same 
therapeutic class as the initial alliance are non-existent. As a result, the market may look 
for additional signals to interpret. How will the new alliance impact BBase? For example, 
branching out and deciding to enter into an alliance which, from the outside, may have 
fewer positive spillover effects than the scenarios in hypotheses 1A and 1B (i.e., working 
on two therapeutic classes may have fewer synergistic aspects than working on two 
projects within the same therapeutic class in two different alliances), may also potentially 
send two different signals, one positive and one negative.  
Let’s start with the positive signal. A new alliance operating in a different therapeutic 
class may signal that the base alliance is on a path that allows PBase to shift resources to 
the new alliance, despite the lower potential for positive spillovers due to the different 
therapeutic classes. Therefore, when PBase enters into a new alliance that operates in a 
different therapeutic class than the base alliance, it may be an even stronger signal that 
the base alliance is on a path toward success and would be able to absorb the strain of 
PBase dividing its attention and resources between the two alliances. Because investors 
won’t have access to perfect information, they will have to rely on other signals and 
interpret them. Here, I suggest that PBase entering into a new alliance will signal that the 
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base alliance is on a trajectory toward success, and I would consequently expect to 
observe that: 
 
Hypothesis 2A: The announcement of a new alliance between PBase and BNewDTC 
operating in a different therapeutic class as the base alliance will positively affect the 
share price of BBase. 
 
The same signal, PBase entering a new alliance focused on a different therapeutic class 
than the base alliance, may also be interpreted as a negative signal as it pertains to the 
base alliance and subsequently BBase. Investors could potentially interpret this signal as a) 
that the base alliance has not made the desired progress toward a successful, marketable 
therapy; b) that BBase is not a desirable partner; and/or that c) the base alliance does not 
have the necessary resources to successfully develop a new therapy in the focal class.  
Generating a positive return on investment ought to be the ultimate goal of the 
alliance. Depending on the purpose of the alliance (e.g. R&D, marketing, etc.), success 
may be defined differently. It goes beyond the scope of this paper as it pertains to 
hypotheses 2A and 2B to define success. I merely suggest that investors who accept the 
fact that PBase will enter into an alliance with a different focus than the initial alliance will 
potentially decode this signal as negative as it affects BBase because it may delay or cancel 
any potential future success. As a result I suggest that: 
 
Hypothesis 2B: The announcement of a new alliance between PBase and BNewDTC 
operating in a different therapeutic class as the base alliance will negatively affect 
the share price of BBase. 
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METHODS 
Sample 
I used a sample of bilateral alliances that include biotech firms and pharmaceutical 
companies. The sample identified the firms as either pharmaceutical or biotech partner. 
Data were taken from Compustat data files, the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) U.S. stock database, the Recombinant Capital Biotechnology Database (ReCap), 
the IMS R&D Focus database, Spectrum Institutional Ownership files, and United States 
Securities and Exchange (SEC) proxy (DEF 14a) filings.  
The initial sample included 28,470 biopharmaceutical alliances established between 
January 1st, 1989 and December 31st, 2008. I used the Wharton Research Data Services 
(WRDS), and specifically, the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database, to 
determine which alliances included both biotech firms and pharmaceutical firms that 
were publicly traded at the end of the month of the event date. Next I further refined the 
event date (date of the alliance announcement) by performing a web search on each 
partner combination in the stated month; this search produced specific alliance 
announcements which allowed me to identify the exact date of the announcement; this 
date was then used to construct the three-day window to measure the cumulative 
abnormal return. Next, I identified all instances in which the pharmaceutical company 
entered into a subsequent alliance with a different biotech firm. I then used the 
therapeutic class as indicator of whether this new alliance operated in the same 
therapeutic class as the base alliance, or not. Data availability constraints limited the final 
sample used in this analysis to a total of 258 new alliances, of which 67 alliances did 
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operate in the same therapeutic class and 191 alliances did not operate in the same 
therapeutic class as the base alliance.  
Measures 
 The variable used to conduct the test of difference between alliances based on their 
respective therapeutic classes is the sum of the abnormal stock returns (cumulative 
abnormal returns, or CAR) of BBase around the time of the alliance announcement 
between PBase and BNew. CAR represents the deviation between the realized return, 
measured by the biotech firm’s actual stock price movement, and the expected return of 
the biotech firm’s stock performance.  CAR has been used extensively as a performance 
measure in joint venture event studies (Gulati, Lavie, & Singh, 2009; Koh & 
Venkatraman, 1991; Park & Kim, 1997; Reuer & Koza, 2000) and as a dependent 
variable in alliance studies (Anand & Khanna, 2000).  
 I calculated the expected return by using a benchmark portfolio comprised of size-
adjusted firms that match the 4-digit SIC code of the sample industry. I monitored the 
return of both the portfolio and the biotech firm during a three-day window [-1, 0, 1] 
around the alliance announcement and calculated the cumulative different over the three 
days as the difference between the two cumulative returns. The short three-day window 
was chosen in an attempt to isolate the news of the alliance announcement and help 
prevent the inclusion of non-alliance related news in the movement of the securities [see, 
for example, Lee et al.(2000)], thus following the argument of market efficiency. I then 
matched the calculated CAR values by firm ID and date to focal biotech firms. 
 Whether the future alliance operated in the same or a different therapeutic class as the 
base alliance is the variable that distinguishes the two different groups of CAR values in 
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this study.  I only considered alliances in which the pharmaceutical company chose a 
different biotech partner than the base alliance. In addition I only included new alliances 
that were announced within three years of the announcement of the base alliance; 
alliances are generally thought-of as active for an average of three years. If the base 
alliance operated in the same therapeutic class as the new alliance, I coded the variable as 
1, otherwise 0.  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for CAR of BBase at the time of the 
announcement of a new alliance between PBase and BNew. Results of the t-test tests of 
differences in means of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of BBase at the time of PBase 
entering into a new alliance with BNew focusing on the same therapeutic class, or not, can 
be found in Table 2. I used a benchmark portfolio consisting of firms within the same 4-
digit SIC code as the focal firm to calculate CAR.  
I first tested for the presence of cumulative abnormal returns by testing whether the 
mean of CAR is statistically significantly different from 0 regardless of the therapeutic 
class. A t-test confirmed that CAR is statistically significant different from 0 at ∝ = 0.05 
(one-sample t(257) = 4.223, p < 0.0001) with a mean difference from 0 of 0.044. 
I next computed the mean for the subsample of CAR values for both a) instances in 
which the new alliance operated in the same therapeutic class as the base alliance, and b) 
instances in which the new alliance operated in a different therapeutic class as the base 
alliance.  
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The findings show that if the new alliance operates in the same therapeutic class as 
the base alliance, the mean cumulative abnormal return of BBase at the time of the 
announcement of the new alliance is positive (0.044). As a result, I reject hypothesis 1B 
which suggested that the announcement of a new alliance would negatively affect the 
share price of BBase. Next, I tested whether this positive mean difference is statistically 
significantly different from 0. A t-test showed that t(67) = 1.822, p = 0.073, suggesting 
that the positive difference between 0.044 and 0 is marginally statistically significant at 
the 0.10 level. As a result I accept hypothesis 1A which states that the announcement of a 
new alliance between PBase and BNewSTC operating in the same therapeutic class as the 
base alliance will positively affect the share price of BBase.   
The mean cumulative abnormal return for BBase at the time of the announcement of a 
new alliance that is not operating in the same therapeutic class is positive as well (0.043). 
I therefore reject hypothesis 2B which suggested that the announcement of a new alliance 
in a different therapeutic class would negatively affect the share price of BBase. The t-test 
showed that t(191) = 3.926, p < 0.0001), suggesting that the positive difference between 
0.043 and 0 is statistically highly significant. I therefore accept hypothesis 2A which 
states that the announcement of a new alliance between PBase and BNewDTC operating in a 
different therapeutic class from that of the base alliance will positively affect the share 
price of BBase.   
As a result, the findings of the t-test support the hypotheses that investors react in a 
positive way to the announcement of a new alliance between PBase and BNew. The result 
holds in both instances in which the new alliance operates in the same class and when it 
does not operate in the same class.  
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In addition to this appropriate test for the stated hypotheses I performance a post-hoc 
analysis (linear mixed regression) using the therapeutic class as a dummy variable in an 
effort to gain a better understanding of whether the therapeutic class of the new alliance 
matters to investors when they react to alliance announcements. Variable descriptions, 
descriptive statistics and the results of the linear mixed regression can be found in 
Appendix A. Table 3 shows the variable description, Table 4 shows the descriptive 
statistics and correlation matrix, and Table 5 shows the result of maximum likelihood 
estimates on CAR of therapeutic class. The findings provide marginal evidence at the 0.1 
level that the therapeutic class does matter when investors react to the alliance 
announcement.   
 The fact that the market valuation changes upon the announcement of a new alliance 
involving PBase is interesting for several reasons. First, it suggests that investors monitor 
events impacting firms that are not directly involved in an event (here, the announcement 
of the new alliance). Thus investors may consider spillover effects to be real and 
important.   
 Second, the investors appear to react more strongly to instances in which the new 
alliance operates in a same therapeutic class than the original alliance. PBase entering into 
a new alliance with a different focus may signal to investors that the original alliance may 
have already or possibly will produce a marketable product. 
 Third, the fact that the new alliance announcement, although not directly involving 
BBase, results in a positive market reaction regardless of the therapeutic class may provide 
additional evidence to prior studies that have found that the market usually reacts 
positively to new alliance announcements (Anand & Khanna, 2000; Dyer et al., 2001; 
97 
 
 
 
Shah & Swaminathan, 2008). An interesting follow-up study could focus further on how 
far beyond the directly involved partners this positive impact reaches.  
I should point out some limitations in this study. First, while prior studies suggested 
that learning as an organizational capability may be closely tied to prior experience 
(Nelson & Winter, 1982), and thus represent a positive asset of the firm, failure of prior 
alliances may send a strong negative signal. My data did not contain any direct 
information on the success of (prior) alliances, which is very difficult to define and 
measure. Earlier studies have used indirect measures, such as previous alliance 
experience (Anand & Khanna, 2000). Future studies may focus on a way to measure and 
code success of alliances directly.  
Second, the available data listed the therapeutic class, which clearly is a focus in this 
study, based on a press release at the time of the alliance formation. There is no guarantee 
that the focus (e.g. therapeutic class) did not change over time. As such, investors may in 
fact have more updated information than the available data contains.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this study was to investigate whether investors monitor post-alliance 
events (i.e., the announcement of a new alliance), interpret the signal, and react to them. I 
derived hypotheses that suggested that investors react to post-alliance events, and that the 
focus of the alliance (i.e., therapeutic class) may matter. The statistical analysis suggests 
that investors do, in fact, react in a statistically significant way to the new alliance. The 
market valuation of the initial partner increases upon the announcement of a new alliance. 
A post hoc analysis also showed that the therapeutic class matters to investors. Further 
98 
 
 
 
analysis is needed to better understand when and how (in which context) the focus of the 
new alliance matters to investors when adjusting the market value of the initial alliance 
partners.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
  
    
Std. 
Error  
    N Mean SD Mean 
  CAR when in same Therapeutic Class 67 .044 .197 .024 
  CAR when NOT in same Therapeutic Class 191 .043 .152 .011 
  
       
       
       Table 2: One Sample T-Tests 
  
Test Value = 0 
t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Diff. 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower Upper 
CAR when in same Therapeutic Class 1.822 66 .073 .044 -.004 .092 
CAR when NOT in same Therapeutic Class 3.926 190 .000 .043 .021 .065 
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Appendix 
Table 3: Definition of variables 
Variable Name Definition 
  
CAR (R&D) The Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) of the R&D partner, calculated 
using a portfolio of firms with the same 2-digit SIC code, adjusted for 
size and transformed (ln) to adjust for non-normality of the data and the 
residuals. 
Therapeutic Class An binary variable, based on whether the therapeutic class of the base 
alliance is the same as the new alliance; 1 = indicates same as base 
alliance, 0 = not same as base alliance. 
Technical Expertise An indicator of the uniqueness of the technical expertise of the two 
partner firms in the focal alliance based on patent citation overlap. A low 
value indicates exploration, a high value indicates exploitation.  
Relationship 
Expertise  
An index describing the level of relationship experience between the two 
partners, calculated as = (Frequency) + (Recency) + (ATSPE); a low 
value indicates exploration, a high value indicates exploitation. 
     Frequency The number or frequency of prior alliance relationships between the two 
firms 
     Recency The recency (in days) of the last alliance relationship between the two. If 
the two partners have not worked before I set the value to 10,000 
     ATSPE The alliance type specific partner experience, indicating if these two 
firms have worked together in this type of alliance before.  
Market Expertise An index describing the FDA approval process experience of the alliance 
partners at the time of the alliance date, calculated as ((C-MKT-Index + 
RD-MKT-Index) x (Alliance Success)). A low value indicates 
exploration, a high value indicates exploitation. 
     C-MKT-Index The cumulative FDA approval process experience of the Client firm in 
each stage of the process and across all stages at the time of the alliance.  
     RD-MKT-Index The cumulative FDA approval process experience of the R&D firm in 
each stage of the process and across all stages at the time of the alliance.  
     Alliance Success The cumulative FDA approval success of the two partners.  
Industry Environment Control variable, an industry index proxying the funding availability in 
the focal industry.  
Age (Client) Control variable, the age of the client firm from the firm’s founding to 
the alliance date. 
Age (R&D) Control variable, the age of the R&D firm from the firm’s founding to 
the alliance date 
Active Alliances 
(Client) 
Control variable, the number of current active alliances of the client firm 
as of the event date. 
Active Alliances 
(R&D) 
Control variable, the number of current active alliances of the R&D firm 
as of the event date. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
              Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 CAR -.437 .211 1 
         2 Therapeutic Class .284 .452 .061 1 
        3 Technical Expertise .426 .494 .074 .035 1 
       4 Relationship Expertise -8666.106 3264.722 -.320** -.021 -.080 1 
      5 Marketing Expertise 510.110 1125.814 .086* .074 .069 -.032 1 
     6 Industry Index 1.465 .319 -.029 -.064 .093* .057 .009 1 
    7 Age (Client) 71.168 85.372 .019 .075 .046 -.008 -.004 -.057 1 
   8 Age (R&D) 20.868 101.413 -.007 -.026 .061 -.007 -.020 .014 .009 1 
  9 Active Alliances (Client) 28.529 28.511 -.005 .081 .047 -.039 -.005 -.079* .087* -.022 1 
 10 Active Alliances (RD) 13.081 16.870 -.015 .101* .059 -.004 -.026 .070* -.025 -.007 .085* 1 
 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 3: Maximum Likelihood estimates on CAR of Therapeutic Class 
     
 
Model 1 
 Explanatory Variable CAR 
 
     Intercept -0.693 (0.072)*** 
Therapeutic Class 0.042 (0.025)†   
Technical Expertise -0.005 (0.023)   
Relationship Expertise -0.000 (0.000)***  
Marketing Expertise -0.000 (0.000)   
Industry Index 0.063 (0.039)   
Age (Client) -0.000 (0.000)   
Age (R&D) 0.000 (0.000)   
Active Alliances (Client) 0.000 (0.004)   
Active Alliances (R&D) 0.000 (0.000)   
 
    Log-likelihood ratio -146.7 
   N 244   
  
 
    Standard errors appear in parentheses 
†p<0.10; *p>0.05; **p>0.01; ***p>0.001 
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